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The dominant vision of labor law scholars is that management
and labor are involved in an incessant tug of war. The major goal of
labor law is to reduce the conflict, and thus promote "industrial
peace." In creating new rules, the National Labor Relations Board
and reviewing courts' typically justify their decisions by appealing to
industrial peace or related national goals, rather than the partisan
interests of management or labor.2 The Board exists to regulate the
t Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1975, Swarthmore College; J.D.
1980, Ph.D. 1981, University of Michigan. I thank Douglas Leslie and colleagues Greg-
ory Alexander, Cynthia Farina, George Hay, Robert Hillman, John Siliciano, and Fred
Zacharias for helpful comments on various drafts. I profited from an April 1985 presen-
tation at the Collective Bargaining Workshop of the New York State School for Indus-
trial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. I received excellent research assistance
from Carol Ann Buckley '85,Joyce Kruczek '85, Susan Leeds '85, and Ben Stephens '86.
1 1 refer to the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) without differentiating
between the Board and courts. I will use both Board and court opinions to illustrate my
argument.
2 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1981)
("[The Act is not intended to serve either party's individual interest, but to foster in a
neutral manner a system in which the conflict between these interests may be re-
solved."); see also Farmer, The NLRB: Its Past, Present and Future, 23 TENN. L. REV. 112,
112 (1954) ("We have no license to abuse our position by lending the power and pres-
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inevitable warfare which underlies the labor market.
This vision of warfare and the need for Leviathan differs dra-
matically from the basic law and economics vision of parties bar-
gaining peacefully over a contract. Like "industrial peace" is for
labor lawyers, "efficiency" is the ever-present term for law and eco-
nomics scholars. But law and economics scholars have a much ros-
ier view of parties' ability to achieve efficient bargains without
intrusive government regulation. They see legal rules as the start-
ing point for bargaining, but believe the parties will reach an effi-
cient bargain regardless of where the law places the parties initially.
The law and economics perspective has important implications
for labor law. This article explores how far the Coase Theorem3 -
the centerpiece of law and economics scholarship-can be pushed in
labor law.4 My thesis is that the Coase Theorem applies to a large
and important class of labor law issues. In this class, arguments
based on industrial peace are misplaced, because the law cannot
promote industrial peace when the Coase Theorem applies.
Specifically, industrial-peace arguments are irrelevant when the
tige of our Government to help industry or labor." (Farmer is ex-NLRB chairman));
Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1676 n.87 (1983)
("When partisans of management or labor criticize labor policy, they generally frame
their arguments in terms of lack of Board neutrality or impartiality." (citing Bok, Reflec-
tions on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1451-52
(1971))).
3 The Coase Theorem has many formulations and has spawned an enormous liter-
ature. See Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost in Retrospect, 2 RES. L. & ECON. 83, 84 (1980).
Simply put, it predicts that absent transaction costs, parties will reach efficient bargains
regardless of initial legal entitlements. Although the article never articulates a precise
theorem, the theorem comes from Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1960).
4 Law and economics scholarship, while penetrating almost every legal discipline,
has been slow to invade labor law, and, in particular, law review writings on labor law.
See Hansmann, The Current State of Law-and-Economics Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217,
224-25 (1983) (noting "conspicuous" absence of law and economics scholarship in labor
law); Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 989 (1984) ("Yet
despite abundant opportunity, there has been relatively little writing in an economic
vein about the particulars of labor law .... ). Professor Douglas Leslie has made an
important contribution on the economic theory of unions and the structure of bargain-
ing units. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984). Professor Leslie has
also introduced economic theory into the second edition of his labor law casebook. D.
LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw (2d ed. 1985). In addition, Professor
Thomas Campbell has used the concept of union as lawful monopolist to critique the
regulation of employer and union economic weapons. Campbell, Labor Law and Econom-
ics, 38 STAN. L. REV. 991 (1986). Professor Alchian has applied relational contract the-
ory to the issue of mandatory subjects of bargaining. Alchian, Decision Sharing and
Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance Corporation v.
NLRB, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 235 (1982). Recent articles in a symposium also apply
economics to labor law. Symposium, The Conceptual Foundations of Labor Law, 51 U. CH.
L. REV. 945 (1984).
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parties can bargain away benefits the law provides one side or the
other. Allowing parties effectively to rewrite the law constricts the
law's power to promote industrial peace. This class of cases is large
and growing. It includes all situations where unions can waive bar-
gaining rights5 or where legal rules establish mere rebuttable pre-
sumptions for construing contracts. 6 In short, industrial peace is an
irrelevant goal in most cases where an established bargaining rela-
tionship exists.
To illustrate the argument, I focus on the controversial 7 Mil-
5 The Supreme Court decision in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693
(1983), is a recent example. There, the Court held that the company violated NLRA
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), by singling out union officers for discipline after
a wildcat strike. The Court emphasized, however, that the company could have disci-
plined the officers more severely than the rank-and-file if the contract explicitly permit-
ted such discipline. See also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (individual
employee's assertion of collective bargaining right is concerted activity under NLRA § 7,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), but employer can negotiate clause limiting methods of asserting
right); NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975) (NLRA § 7 gives union-
ized employees right to union steward at investigatory meeting that may lead to discipli-
nary action; Board subsequently held in Prudential Ins. Co., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1073
(1985), that union can waive Weingarten right). For a general discussion of waiver cases,
see THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 640-50 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
6 The classic, important Steelworkers Trilogy-setting forth the presumption of arbi-
trability-is in the class of cases under analysis here. United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960). Cases interpreting no-strike clauses are also in this class. For example, see
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1715 (1985), enforcement denied sub nom.
Local Union 1395, IBEW v. NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1986), where the Board
reversed the long-standing presumption that a no-strike clause excludes the promise not
to engage in sympathy strikes. The Board will now find that a union breaches a no-strike
clause if it engages in a sympathy strike, unless the contract specifically allows sympathy
strikes or extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the parties intended to allow sympathy
strikes.
7 See Unions Face New Hurdles, Threats After Milwaukee Spring Ruling, 2 Employee
Rel. Weekly (BNA) 131 (Feb. 6, 1984) (union representatives see Milwaukee II as "cor-
ruption of labor law" that "will promote a kind of blackmail"); NLRB Hears Argument on
Removal of Unit Work to Nonunion Plant, 1 Employee Rel. Weekly (BNA) 111 (Sept. 26,
1983) (management attorney criticizes Milwaukee I as "inconsistent with the economic
realities of the marketplace"); MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: NLRB Angers Labor 9,11 (PBS
television broadcast, Jan. 24, 1984) (transcript no. 2172 on file at Cornell Law Review)
(management attorney calls Milwaukee 11 of "critical importance to business"; union at-
torney says Milwaukee II "gives employers another way to try to attack the standard of
living of American workers"). The affirmance of Milwaukee 1I by the D.C. Circuit contin-
ued the controversy. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at A25, col. I ("decision with far-
reaching implications" that will "clearly hurt unions").
As often happens, the legal debate has outlasted the factual controversy. Although
the Milwaukee Spring division ultimately won the right to relocate work, apparently no
relocations occurred. According to company sources, a union wage concession resolved
the controversy. In the end, workers lost no jobs at the unionized plant and the com-
pany transferred no assembly line work to the nonunion plant. Milwaukee Spring II
Upheld, Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 696, at 1, 2 (June 21, 1985).
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waukee Spring cases8 and on NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.9 In Milwaukee
I & II, the Board first prohibited and then allowed a company to
relocate bargaining-unit work during the contract term. In Wein-
garten, the Court prohibited an employer from denying an em-
ployee's request that her union representative be present at an
investigatory interview that could result in disciplinary action. The
policy arguments in Milwaukee I & 11 and in Justice Powell's dissent
in Weingarten center on industrial peace and related national goals.
My thesis suggests that the Board and Court had no power to affect
industrial peace in these cases. Arguments based on industrial peace
were therefore specious.
Abandoning industrial peace as the rhetoric of decision making
would have important consequences. It may well change our con-
ception of the proper role of the Board and the "neutrality" of our
labor laws. One can easily envision far-reaching social conse-
quences if Board decisions openly declared: "We again accept man-
agement's [labor's] position in this case because we have a
distributive goal of favoring management [labor], and we need not
consider any other issues because we cannot influence them." Nev-
ertheless, to the extent that the costless10 Coase Theorem applies to
collective bargaining, this type of Board opinion is appropriate be-
cause the Board cannot promote "industrial peace."
The balance of this article examines the extent to which the
Coasean vision applies to collective bargaining. I proceed in six
stages. First, I demonstrate that industrial peace is substantially
equivalent to the law and economics conception of efficiency. Part
II applies the Coase Theorem to collective bargaining. I show that
the Board, in establishing rights or setting presumptions of contract
interpretation, cannot affect efficiency or industrial peace if the
union and management remain free to bargain.1 ' Part III considers
8 Milwaukee Spring Div., 265 N.L.R.B. 206 (1982) (Milwaukee I), rev'd on reh'g, 268
N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (Milwaukee II), aff'd sub nom. UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
9 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
10 The Coase Theorem assumes the absence of transaction costs. This article often
describes the theorem as the "costless Coase Theorem" to emphasize its assumption of
no transaction costs.
11 Law and economics scholars may find it implausible to apply the Coase Theo-
rem, with its assumption of zero transaction costs, to collective bargaining. An alterna-
tive model of relational contracts may ultimately prove equally useful in examining the
effect of labor law on collective bargaining. This model emphasizes the amorphous na-
ture of contracts between parties in long-term relationships and the difficulties of chang-
ing terms. See generally I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Goldberg, Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Con-
tracts, 23 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 337 (1980). Some of this literature applies the relational con-
tract model in a general way to labor contracts. See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
248 [Vol. 72:245
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the major criticisms of Coasean analysis. Without denying the gen-
eral force of the criticisms, I suggest that the Coase Theorem may
be more appropriately applied to labor negotiations than to many
other contexts. Part IV examines Weingarten, and suggests the criti-
cisms have even less force in that situation than in Milwaukee I & II.
Part V examines what legitimate policy arguments are left decision
makers once industrial peace is rejected as beyond their grasp. Part
VI examines normative mimic-the-market implications of the Coase
Theorem if transaction costs are significant.
I
INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND EFFICIENCY
In January 1982, during the second year of a three year collec-
tive bargaining agreement with the United Auto Workers, the Mil-
waukee Spring Division of the Illinois Coil Spring Company lost a
major contract. To alleviate the resulting financial difficulties, the
company asked the union for midterm concessions on wages and
other contract items. 12 When the union refused the company's re-
quest, the company began transferring work to its non-unionized
plant and laying off union workers at Milwauke6 Spring. The union
filed an unfair labor practice charge.
The Board's problem was that the contract did not expressly
declare whether the company could transfer work during the con-
tract term to avoid paying the union wage. The contract contained
the usual array of clauses that hinted at the parties' intent-wage
and benefit provisions, a union recognition clause, a management
rights clause, 13 an arbitration clause, and a zipper clause14-but the
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); Williamson, Wachter & Harris, Understanding the Employment
Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELLJ. ECON. 250 (1975). In a pioneering
article, Professor Leslie has used the relational contract model to examine the detailed
Board rules governing appropriate bargaining units. Leslie, supra note 4; see also Note,
An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over Partial Termination and Plant Relocation Deci-
sions, 95 YALE LJ. 949 (1986).
Rather than adopt the relational contract model, this article applies the costless
Coase Theorem to collective bargaining. It is important to see what insights basic
Coasean analysis can shed on labor law, before investigating more complex models of
collective bargaining.
12 The company's assembly labor costs at the unionized Milwaukee Spring plant
were $8 an hour in wages and $2 an hour in fringe benefits. In contrast, at the com-
pany's non-unionized McHenry plant, assembly labor costs were $4.50 an hour in wages
and $1.35 an hour in fringe benefits. Milwaukee 1, 265 N.L.R.B. at 207.
13 The management rights clause provided:
Except as expressly limited by the other Articles of this Agreement,
the Company shall have the exclusive right to manage the plant and busi-
ness and direct the working forces.
These rights include, but are not limited to, the right to plan, direct
and control operations, to determine the operations of services to be per-
formed in or at the plant or by the employees of the Company, to estab-
1987] 249
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contract contained no precise language on relocation. Thus, the
Board faced a classic "gap" problem. 15
In Milwaukee I, the Board held that the transfer violated sections
8(a) (1), 8 (a) (5), and 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act. 16 The
Board noted that the company would clearly violate the Act if it re-
duced contract wages during the contract term. The Board refused
to condone the transfer of work to reduce labor costs, because the
company could thereby" 'achieve by indirection that which [it could
not] achieve by direct means under Section 8(d) of the Act.' 17
Only if the union expressly waived its statutory right to object could
the company transfer work."'
In its brief before the Seventh Circuit,' 9 the Milwaukee I Board
justified its decision by looking to the policies underlying section
8(d). Congress designed section 8(d) "to stabilize industrial rela-
tions by fostering collective bargaining agreements binding upon
employers, unions and employees alike." 20 The Board emphasized
lish and maintain production and quality standards, to schedule the
working hours, to hire, promote, demote, and transfer, to suspend, disci-
pline or discharge for just cause or to relieve employees because of lack
of work or for other legitimate reasons, to introduce new and improved
methods, materials or facilities, or to change existing methods, materials
or facilities.
Id. at 209-10.
14 A zipper clause "purports to close out bargaining during the contract term and
to make the written contract the exclusive statement of the parties' rights and obliga-
tions." R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING 471 (1976).
15 See Farnsworth, Disputes over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860 (1968)
(when confronted with gap in agreement, courts generally attempt to predict how par-
ties would have allocated risk had they considered contingency); Hillman, An Analysis of
the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 627-28 (1983) ("Con-
tracting parties may fail to consider and plan for contingencies that will arise because of
the limitations of the human mind and imagination in anticipating the future .... ").
16 Section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), makes it an unfair labor practice to
interfere with employees' § 7 rights to form unions, bargain collectively, and engage in
other concerted activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1982), makes a company's refusal to bargain collectively with the union an
unfair labor practice. Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), defines the duty to bar-
gain in good faith: "[W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract. . ., the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate
or modify such contract, unless [certain conditions are met]."
17 Milwaukee II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 610 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting) (quoting
Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720, 735 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d
1302 (9th Cir. 1979)). Zimmerman's dissent expressed this rationale more clearly than
did Milwaukee I.
18 Milwaukee , 265 N.L.R.B. at 209.
19 The company sought review of Milwaukee I in the Seventh Circuit. After a change
in Board membership, the Seventh Circuit before decision granted the Board's request
to remand the case to the Board. After the Board reversed itself in Milwaukee II, the
union petitioned for review in the District of Columbia Circuit. For a procedural de-
scription of the case, see UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
20 Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 10, Milwaukee Spring Div. v.
[Vol. 72:245
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that industrial stability depends "'upon the binding nature of col-
lective bargaining agreements.' ",21 The policy rationale of Milwau-
kee I, then, is that the Board furthers industrial stability by
presuming, absent an express clause to the contrary, that a company
cannot transfer work midterm to avoid the contract's terms. 22
In Milwaukee II, the Board again analyzed the issue in terms of
industrial peace, but reversed its prior decision. The Board con-
cluded that, absent an express work-preservation clause in the con-
tract, allowing the company to transfer work best served the
national interest. As the Board argued in its Milwaukee 11 brief,23
"'[T]he purpose of the Act is to encourage labor/management
peace by resolving differences through collective-bargaining and to
stabilize agreed upon conditions during the term of a [contract].' "24
By shifting the content of its industrial peace rationale-from the
need to enforce binding contracts, to the need to enforce only ex-
press terms-the Board reversed itself, yet used industrial peace to
justify both results.
NLRB, 718 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-2736) (citing United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)); see also Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957) (" 'Statutory recognition of the collective agree-
ment as a valid, binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will
promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will
thereby promote industrial peace.'" (quoting S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS AcT, 1947, at 407, 423 (1948))).
21 Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, supra note 20, at 10 (quoting
NLRB v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 653 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1981)).
22 Chairman Van de Water, author of the opinion, has explained the Milwaukee I
rationale as based on a fundamental principle of contract law that one party to a bargain
cannot unilaterally act to deprive the other party of the benefit of the bargain. Van de
Water, Influences of the National Labor Relations Board in the Early Years of the Reagan Adminis-
tration, 36 LABOR LJ. 867, 869 (1985); cf. Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of
Contracts, 78 YALE LJ. 525, 569-70 (1969) (contract principle of good faith and fair deal-
ing relevant to whether employer can contract out work). This rationale is articulated
neither in Milwaukee I and 11 nor in any supporting briefs.
23 Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 23, UAW v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (No. 84-1106).
24 Id. at 27 (quoting Boeing Co. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1978)). The
Milwaukee 1I Board also argued that the promotion of frank and honest discussions be-
tween labor and management provided a separate justification for its decision. Id. at 35-
37. Under Milwaukee 11 management would have no incentive to disguise its true motive
when the move is an effort to lower labor costs. Member Zimmerman, dissenting in
Milwaukee II, rejected this argument. He acknowledged that Milwaukee I could induce an
employer to disguise its true reasons for leaving; an employer could transfer work for
any reason other than to reduce labor costs. Nevertheless, Zimmerman insisted that an
employer considering relocation to reduce labor costs would admit that labor costs mo-
tivated the move in hopes of persuading the union to accede to a reduction, enabling the
employer to avoid the disruption of moving. Zimmerman concluded that the Board
should not undermine the congressional policy against continuous bargaining (as re-
flected in NLRA § 8(d)) merely because some violators of the Act may avoid punish-
ment. 268 N.L.R.B. at 612.
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The policy arguments in Milwaukee I & II typify those advanced
in labor law cases. Each side frames its arguments in terms of indus-
trial peace, claiming that its result promotes peace. Labor lawyers
and the Board generally minimize the distributive effect of a deci-
sion on labor or management, preferring to speak in "neutral" or
"national" terms: furthering "industrial peace" and the "free flow
of commerce, '"25 promoting "the collective-bargaining process,"'26
or aiding some other national labor law goal that transcends the in-
terests of labor or management. 27 The primacy of industrial peace
as a policy goal is emphasized in the Senate report for the 1935
Wagner Act: "The first objective of the bill is to promote industrial
peace." 28 Industrial peace is a goal throughout labor law,29 but re-
25 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) ("A
fundamental aim of the National Labor Relations Act is the establishment and mainte-
nance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce.").
26 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50, 62 (1975) (goal of national labor policy is to minimize "industrial strife" by encour-
aging collective bargaining); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211
(1964) (bargaining over contracting out work "would promote the fundamental purpose
of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management within the
framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace").
27 See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 424 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring) (NLRA "intended to further broader national interests than those of
either labor or management"); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 568 (1966) (In
enacting NLRA, Congress determined "that, despite management's interest in absolute
freedom to run the business as it sees fit, the interests of employees are of sufficient
importance that their representatives ought be consulted in matters affecting them, and
that the public interest, which includes the interests of both employers and employees, is
best served by subjecting problems between labor and management to the mediating
influence of collective bargaining."); Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 319-20 (1978)
("union conduct would not be judged solely against the backdrop of competing em-
ployer and employee interests, but against the public interest in industrial peace as
well").
28 S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1935), reprinted in 5 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE NLRA 2300, 2300 (1935); see alsoJ. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS
IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 111 (1983) ("The most commonly expressed goal of the Wag-
ner Act was the achievement of industrial peace.").
29 See, e.g., NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees Local 1182, 106 S. Ct. 1007, 1016
(1986) ("The basic purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to preserve industrial
peace."); NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 836 (1984) (individual employee
claiming contract right engaged in "concerted" activity because claim "breathes life...
into the entire process envisioned by Congress as the means by which to achieve indus-
trial peace"); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) (employer's good faith doubt of
union's continuing majority support is insufficient reason to refuse to bargain, for "re-
fusing to bargain with the formally designated union is .. .inimical to" "underlying
[statutory] purpose of... industrial peace"); NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464,
476 (1953) (employee properly fired for disloyal acts, because "[n]othing would contrib-
ute less to the Act's declared purpose of promoting industrial peace and stability" than
requiring employer to finance such activities);J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338
(1944) (individual contracts generally must yield to less advantageous collective bargain
because "advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial peace as disad-
vantages"); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (experience
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ceives particular attention in cases dealing with work preservation
and plant relocation.30
The term "industrial peace," unfortunately, has become a buzz
word for any argument relying on the national interest distinct from
the narrow aims of labor or management. As a result, the term has
become so vague and overused in labor law31 that it provides little
guidance to disputants or decision makers. This article suggests
that industrial peace can be equated with the economic notion of
efficiency. Efficiency occurs when resources flow to their most val-
ued uses, so that society obtains the maximum output from its re-
sources: in short, an efficient system maximizes the overall social
pie. To complete this connection between industrial peace and effi-
ciency requires further analysis of the content of the term industrial
peace.
One might initially characterize industrial peace as tranquil re-
lations between labor and management. More concretely, industrial
peace may mean the absence of strikes. Labor law, however, has
never sought to prevent all strikes.3 2 Indeed, the NLRA specifically
preserves and protects the right to strike.3 3 In urging industrial
shows that employees' right to collective bargaining is often necessary for industrial
peace).
30 E.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (Act
obliges employer to bargain collectively with union regarding replacement of members
with employees of independent contractor; mandating such bargaining "promote[s] the
fundamental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and
management within the framework established by Congress as most conducive to indus-
trial peace"); First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (company
need not bargain with union when it decides to close part of its operations, because
national interest in industrial peace would not be furthered by making this topic
mandatory subject of bargaining). First National Maintenance, the latest Supreme Court
word on the duty to bargain over plant closings, is not directly relevant to Milwaukee
Spring's decision to transfer, rather than cease, operations. The parties in Milwaukee I &
11 stipulated that a company must bargain over the decision to transfer work to reduce
labor costs. The Board, in Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 894 (1984), later de-
clared that "[h]ad the parties [in Milwaukee I & I1] not stipulated, we would have so
held" that the decision was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
31 Charles Fried describes the "vast, ponderous, powerful, but threadbare middle
view" of labor law policy arguments in this way: "Built up of formulas repeated until
they have become platitudes, this view proclaims such values as equalizing the bargain-
ing power of labor and management, forming a partnership of labor and management,
instituting industrial democracy, and, at every turn, preserving industrial peace." Fried,
Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law
and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1017 (1984).
32 See A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 12 (1960) ("[N]o one sup-
posed that strikes would be eliminated [by the Wagner Act]."); cf.J. ATLESON, supra note
28, at 7 ("The right to strike is granted because the threat to withdraw labor power, or
its actual withdrawal, is the only employee action that will make collective bargaining
effective, and collective bargaining, in turn, will encourage 'industrial peace.' ").
33 NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982). Section 13 reads: "Nothing in this sub-
chapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere
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peace, then, Congress had a broader aim than simply limiting
strikes. Ultimately, Congress desired to maintain a capitalist econ-
omy and to promote smooth and efficient commerce. 34 It deter-
mined that optimal labor policy would leave labor relations to
private, collective bargaining between labor and management.
Protected and promoted by the national government, collective
bargaining is intended to prevent fundamental, perhaps violent, up-
heaval in our industrial system.a5 Undoubtedly strikes will occur be-
cause they are a necessary element of private collective
bargaining.36 But a system in which private parties write their own
contracts in accordance with their private interests will also promote
the free flow of resources to those who value them most highly. Put-
ting resources to their most valued use is the essence of an efficient
economy.3 7 It thus seems natural to equate the goal of industrial
peace with the goal of an efficient economy where capital and labor
flow freely.3 8
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications on that right." (Taft-Hartley amendments in italics).
34 The Act's declaration of policy illustrates the concern for an efficient economy.
Section 1, as amended, refers to the efficient flow of commerce 10 times, concluding: "It
is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain sub-
stantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred .... 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
In enacting § 1 Congress primarily sought to convince the Supreme Court that the
Act was a constitutional use of Congress's powers under the commerce clause. See 1 J.
GRoss, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 144 (1974) (Section I
was revised "'to emphasize the effect of labor disputes on interstate commerce and to
de-emphasize the mere economic effects which had been rejected by the court.'" (quot-
ing Philip Levy of Board's Legal Division)). Beyond this immediate concern, Congress
was concerned with national goals beyond the partisan interests of labor and manage-
ment. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
35 See Klare, supra note 27, at 273-74 ("[T]he more sophisticated sectors of the busi-
ness community recognized that government intervention in the private sector was es-
sential to rationalize the chaos of a market economy, to enhance the stability,
predictability, and security of the competitive capitalist system, and to provide a stable
political environment in which the corporations could get on with the business of mak-
ing reasonable profits." (footnote omitted)); id. at 282 ("[I]ndustrial warfare clearly pro-
moted other undesirable conditions, such as political turmoil, violence, and general
uncertainty.").
36 See A. Cox, supra note 32, at 12 ("Freedom to strike, the threat of a strike, and
possibly a number of actual strikes are indispensable parts of a national labor policy
based upon the establishment of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment through private collective bargaining.").
37 Critical legal theorists object to this definition of efficiency, but agree that it is
the one commonly used by contemporary labor lawyers. See Lesnick, The Consciousness of
Work and the Values of American Labor Law (Book Review), 32 BUFFALO L. REv. 833, 856
(1983) ("An alternative consciousness would see efficiency as seeking to maximize some-
thing more than the quantity of things that exists in the world, and freedom as some-
thing more than permission to compete with one another for scarce resources.").
38 For an example of equating the free flow of commerce with a national goal in a
different context, see Note, The Propriety of Section 10(j) Bargaining Orders in Gissel Situa-
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Many critics see unions as inefficient monopolies of labor sup-
ply,39 and question the efficiency of a system that promotes collec-
tive bargaining. The corollary question is whether the primary goal
of a system that fosters unions-industrial peace-could possibly be
equated with efficiency. Others have emphasized that unions can
promote efficiency, either as countervailing powers against employ-
ers' monopsony power 40 or as institutions that solve collective
goods problems in the workplace. 41 Under this view, a system pro-
moting collective bargaining could well be primarily concerned with
efficiency.
Even under the former view, however, Congress in establishing
collective bargaining could be seen as making a metadecision about
efficiency: our industrial system will not survive without collective
bargaining.42 If unions are necessary for the system to survive, one
can comfortably equate the goal of industrial peace with the goal of
efficiency. 43
Congress's decision to use collective bargaining as the method
of achieving industrial peace has important consequences. This ar-
ticle stresses the limited role of legal rules in furthering industrial
peace. Because collective bargaining allows private parties to con-
tract around legal rules, decision makers cannot promote the sys-
tem's efficiency, or industrial peace, by adopting a particular rule.
Recognizing this limit on the applicability of the industrial peace
justification for various legal rules, future decision makers must jus-
tify in other ways the rules they have chosen. Using Milwaukee I & 11
tions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 112, 118 n.27 (1983) ("Congress equated the public interest with
the free flow of commerce .... ").
39 J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 380-82 (3d ed. 1984); Fried-
man, Labor Unions and Economic Policy (labor unions and enterprise monopolies have simi-
lar effects, often exaggerated), in LABOR AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 22 (W. Bowen ed.
1965); Lazear, A Microeconomic Theory of Labor Unions, in NEw APPROACHES TO LABOR UN-
IONS 53 (J. Reid ed. Supp. 2, 1983).
40 See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, MICROECONOMICS 347 (5th ed. 1979) ("Because a
wage-setting union has the effect of turning the employer into a price taker in the labor
market, the union facing a monopsonist can duplicate the competitive results."); F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 306-12 (2d ed.
1980) (discussing countervailing power and consumer prices). The classic statement of
countervailing power is by J.K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952).
41 See Leslie, supra note 4, at 359 ("A union can reduce its membership's cost of"
securing collective goods.). For an appraisal of the efficiency effects of unions generally,
see R. FREEMAN &J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
42 One way of viewing this proposition is that Congress made two decisions: First,
collective bargaining was necessary to avoid violent revolution against the industrial sys-
tem; and second, we should strive for the next best result of efficiency constrained by the
existence of unions.
43 See Fried, supra note 31, at 1022 ("It has been suggested more than once that our
system of labor law must and does serve the concerns of efficiency and productivity.").
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as the focal point, Parts II and III illustrate this limit on the role of
legal rules and the consequent irrelevancy of the industrial peace
rationale in this class of cases.
Obviously, I drastically oversimply labor law by claiming that all
labor law rules are designed to promote industrial peace. Propo-
nents of the original Wagner Act emphasized that collective bar-
gaining would also further industrial democracy, so that workers
could have a voice in controlling their working life.44 The Taft-
Hartley amendments emphasized the freedom of workers to reject
collective bargaining. 4 5 But these alternate societal goals have been
overshadowed by the concern for industrial peace. Although usually
secondary to industrial peace,4 6 valid distributional goals remain
present in labor law. Distributional goals, as opposed to societal
goals, directly favor labor or management, and only secondarily
promote a societal goal like industrial peace. Part IV discusses the
most prominent distributional goals in labor law: equalizing bar-
gaining power and maintaining management's reserved rights.
Under the costless Coase Theorem, the law can only affect distribu-
tion. Thus, only distributional goals, as opposed to industrial
peace, are relevant in determining and justifying legal rules.
II
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER THE COASE THEOREM
In this section I sketch the reasoning behind the costless Coase
Theorem's prediction that labor and management will bargain to
the same, efficient result regardless of the Board's rules on initial
entitlements or contract interpretation. 4 7 I then examine whether
44 See 1 J. GRoss, supra note 34, at 16 (Sen. Wagner wrote that program would
"'make America safe for industrial democracy'" (quoting letter from Sen. Robert F.
Wagner to Marion Smith (Oct. 22, 1933))); Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another
Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LABOR REL. REV. 7, 10 (1985) (Sen.
Wagner "considered the advancement of economic and social justice, rather than the
reduction of industrial strife, to be the primary objective of the Wagner Act.");
Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 199,
218 (1960) (Sen. Wagner "valued the measure.., as an affirmative vehicle for the eco-
nomic and related social progress to which his life-long efforts were devoted."). For a
modem-day call for industrial democracy, see Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93
YALE L.J. 793 (1984).
45 The Taft-Hartley Act amended § 7 of the NLRA to state expressly that employ-
ees "have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities." NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1982); see Gross, supra note 44, at 13 ("The 1947 Declaration of Policy, coupled
with a passage added in 1947 to section 7 that affirms workers' right to refrain from
engaging in collective bargaining, has been interpreted to mean that free choice and
individual rights are at least as important as the right to collective bargaining.").
46 See Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 590, 594 (1985) ("Since [the Great Depression], 'industrial harmony' has replaced
equality of bargaining power' as the primary justification of our labor law.")
47 I emphasize that the Coase Theorem predicts only that the parties will bargain to
rr -r - rr Lv'-,..
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the Board's rules affect distribution. I proceed by using a simplified
model of the Milwaukee Spring contract negotiations as an example.
A. Effect of Milwaukee I & 11 on Efficiency
The protagonists are a company and union ready to negotiate
(or renegotiate) a three year collective bargaining contract.48 The
company seeks the lowest possible wage, but will profit from any
wage less than $10 an hour.49 The company also wants the right to
transfer work to its non-union plant if market conditions change and
the contract wage proves unprofitable. The company is willing to
pay up to $600,000 (or $1 an hour per worker) for this right.50 Es-
sentially, the company wants insurance that the three-year contract
will not unduly tie its hands.5'
The union seeks the highest possible wage for its members. To
remain viable, however, the union must secure a contract that pro-
vides better conditions than the non-union alternative of employ-
ment-at-will at $6 an hour. Workers want job security as well as
high wages. Indeed, the union would give up as much as $2 an hour
(or $1.2 million over the life of the contract) to obtain this security.
On these assumptions, the union values security (i.e., a "stay"
clause) more than the company values the right to relocate produc-
an efficient outcome. The Theorem does not analyze the process by which the parties
reach agreement. Indeed, Professor Regan criticizes the Coase Theorem because "it
reaches a conclusion about the result of individuals' economic behavior without any
model of how individuals behave." Regan, The Problem of Sodal Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. &
EcoN. 427, 428 (1972). He thus considers the Coase prediction of efficient bargains an
"a priori" claim. Id. For an examination of theprocess of labor negotiations, see R. WAL-
TON & R. McKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965).
48 A Bureau of National Affairs survey found that 80% of labor contracts in manu-
facturing industries and 78% of contracts in nonmanufacturing industries are of three-
year duration. 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 36:1-:2 (1966). Collective
bargaining contracts rarely exceed three years, in part because the Board's contract-bar
rules only protect the incumbent union from rivals for three years. See [2 Labor Rela-
tions] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 2730.69 (1972).
49 Assume that labor is the only input in the production process and that the firm
employs 100 workers. The work force produces 1,000 widgets an hour, and the com-
pany can sell as many widgets as it makes for $1 each. Under these assumptions, reve-
nues will exceed costs as long as the wage is less than $10 an hour. More generally, the
$10 wage could be characterized as the point at which the firm makes only normal
profits.
50 If the firm hires 100 employees for three years and each employee works 40
hours a week, 50 weeks a year, then the firm purchases 600,000 hours of labor. Each $1
an hour wage increase costs the company $600,000 over the life of the contract. Ignor-
ing the discounted present value of future payments simplifies the analysis without sacri-
ficing its insights.
51 For simplicity, I reduce the negotiations to two contract terms: the wage and the
right to relocate.
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tion (i.e., a "go" clause). Figure 1 sketches the preferences. 52
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The protagonists confront two separate issues: whether to in-
clude a go clause or a stay clause in the contract; and what wage to
pay. To benefit, bargainers must resolve both issues.53 The costless
Coase Theorem predicts that rational bargainers will resolve the
first issue by putting the highest-valued clause in the contract be-
cause this maximizes the total value of the bargain.54 The parties
will reach this solution regardless of their initial entitlements. The
Theorem does not firmly predict how the parties will resolve the
second issue-dividing the surplus created by the bargain.
The Coasean result occurs in the following manner. The union
52 Because the stay/go clause is an either/or situation, the parties will be at either
the top or the bottom of the box and cannot stop in the middle.
53 In general, bargainers must decide who gets which item and how to divide the
surplus created by the bargain. Professor Cooter terms this process a "bargaining
game," a game in which "production is contingent upon agreement about distribution."
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, IlJ. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1982).
54 The parties may include an explicit stay/go clause in the contract, or they may
leave the contract silent on this issue and rely on the interpretation of Milwaukee I or H.
In either case, the highest valued clause becomes part of the contract.
STAY
CLAUSE
GO
CLAUSE
$5 $6 $7
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enters negotiations with labor for sale. In addition, under Milwaukee
I the company cannot transfer work to avoid the contract wage un-
less the agreement includes an express go clause. The union can
sell this Milwaukee I right to the company, but recall that the com-
pany values this right less than the union does. Suppose the parties
tentatively agree on a wage rate of $8 an hour (point A in Figure 1).
The company then offers to raise the wage to $8.50 in exchange for
a go clause (point B). The union will reject this offer because it will
not trade its implicit stay clause for less than a $2 an hour increase
in wages. Only a wage above $10 would induce the union to move
from $8 and its implicit Milwaukee I stay clause. The company simi-
larly will reject any counteroffer by the union because the largest
wage increase the company will accept for a go clause is $1 an hour.
Therefore, the company will prefer the original $8 an hour to $10
an hour with a right-to-go clause. In effect, when bargaining under
Milwaukee I (which presumes a stay clause), once the parties tenta-
tively agree on a wage no other contract can benefit both parties. 55
In sum, given the assumed preferences of the parties and the rule
established in Milwaukee I, the Coase Theorem predicts that the con-
tract will include a stay clause and have a wage somewhere between
$4 and $10 an hour.56
Alternatively, suppose the parties bargain under Milwaukee I.
Under this rule, the company can move unless the contract specifies
otherwise. Again, suppose the parties tentatively agree on a wage of
$8 an hour (point C), with an implicit go clause. The union would
accept a wage as low as $6 accompanied by a stay clause. The com-
pany would accept a stay clause if wages were below $7. Room for
trade exists. Suppose the union suggests lowering the wage to $6.50
in exchange for a stay clause. The company will accept this proposal
(perhaps haggling to reduce the wage to $6), and the contract will
contain an explicit stay clause. Thus, under both Milwaukee I and 1H
the contract will require the company to stay during the contract
term.
55 The Coase Theorem predicts that the parties will move to a point on the contract
curve (the set of Pareto-optimal points from which it is impossible to move and make
one party better off without making the other party worse off). The Coase Theorem
does not predict the point on the contract curve at which the parties will rest. In Figure
1, the contract curve is the top of the Edgeworth box between points D and E. To the
left of point D, employees prefer to work in a non-unionized firm, whereas to the right of
point E, the company prefers to shut down.
56 The Theorem does not predict a precise wage figure. Any wage between $4 and
$10 an hour will be efficient because it lies on the contract curve. An efficient outcome
occurs when the parties have exhausted all potential gains to trade, i.e., no further trade
makes one party better off without making the other party worse off. Again, whether a
party is better off from a trade depends solely on that party's evaluation of the trade,
given its preferences.
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Nothing inherent in work relocation makes a stay clause more
or less efficient than a go clause. By definition, the efficient outcome
depends solely on the relative valuations of labor and manage-
ment.57 In the above example, the stay clause is efficient because
the union values it more than the company values a go clause. If
relative preferences of the company and the union are reversed, so
that the company values a go clause more highly, the Coase predic-
tion is also reversed. Under either Milwaukee I or II, the contract
would allow the company to move during the contract term, the
now-efficient outcome.
The Coase Theorem thus predicts that, in the absence of trans-
action costs, Milwaukee I or 11 cannot affect job security or the mobil-
ity of capital during the contract term. Instead, the parties'
preferences determine the contract terms. Recall that, in justifying
Milwaukee I, the Board proclaimed that the result promoted indus-
trial peace by fostering contract stability. If contract stability means
that the company should not be able to transfer work during the
contract term, the Coase Theorem demonstrates that the Board's
decision is irrelevant. Regardless of the Board's holding, the com-
pany will stay only if the union values a stay clause more than the
company values mobility.
Some commentators support Milwaukee I by arguing that it en-
sures capital mobility and the free flow of commerce, 58 a goal ex-
pressed in section 1 of the NLRA. Rubbish, says the Coase
Theorem. Again, only the preferences of the parties, not the rule of
law, determine whether the company may leave during the contract
57 See supra note 56. If the collective bargaining contract creates third-party exter-
nalities, the efficient outcome also depends upon the relative valuations by these third
parties to a stay/go clause. This article assumes that no such externalities exist.
58 See, e.g., W. WENDLING, THE PLANT CLOSURE POLICY DILEMMA 71 (1984) ("Mil-
waukee Spring .... , which mandates bargaining over relocation but permits relocation
during the contract if the bargainers reach impasse, is more consistent with maintaining
profitable operations and employment."); Brown, Current Developments at the NLRB: Uni-
lateral Management Decisions During the Term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 EMPLOYEE
REL. LJ. 134, 139 (1984) (Milwaukee II is "consistent with the underlying purpose of the
NRLA [sic] to promote collective bargaining as a means of preserving industrial peace.
That policy does not and should not insulate employees covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements from the marketplace realities that require reorganization or reloca-
tion."); Isaacson, Reconsidering Milwaukee Spring: Going Forward by Looking Backward, 9
EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 389, 391 (1983-84) ("In the last analysis, the wisdom of the Board's
position on the work removal issue must be judged by its impact on the vitality and
competitiveness of the American economy. In that regard, Milwaukee Spring[I] comes up
a loser; it can only sap the vitality and blunt the competitiveness of the American econ-
omy. In tampering with the long-established right of employers to make major en-
trepreneurial decisions, the Board, purportedly to save jobs over the short term, will
negatively affect the long-term viability of companies with a genuine need to divert
work.").
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term. The law simply cannot affect the efficiency of contracts. 59
Others have suggested that Milwaukee 11 may lead to more
strikes and that the choice of a legal rule can thus affect industrial
peace.60 Under Milwaukee 11 the union cannot rely on the law to
prevent the company from transferring work. Instead, goes the ar-
gument, the union must bargain and perhaps strike to preserve jobs.
If a Board decision in a case like Milwaukee 11 affects the rate of
strikes, then the Board also affects industrial peace. Justifications
based on "industrial peace" would then be relevant. The argument,
however, is unconvincing. True, under Milwaukee 11 the union must
demand a stay clause. But under Milwaukee I the company could
insist on a right-to-leave clause. Either scenario could lead to im-
passe and a strike or lockout. 6' As argued below, 62 the collective
bargaining relationship minimizes this possibility.
B. Distributional Impact of Milwaukee I & I1
If law has such a limited effect, one may wonder why the parties
feel so strongly about the choice of legal rules and why the decision
generates such controversy. 63 So far, I have suggested that the
Board rule cannot affect the long-run efficiency of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The rule will, however, have a short-run and
possibly a long-run distributional effect.
In the short run, a shift in the legal rule creates windfall gains
and losses to parties in the midst of a contract. This applies to both
the litigated contract 64 and other contracts with similar clauses in-
terpreted in light of the new rule.65 For example, when Milwaukee II
overruled Milwaukee I, employers under existing contracts without
59 Changing the interpretation of contract silence creates short-run inefficiencies
until parties who relied on the former law can insert clauses responsive to the new legal
interpretation.
60 "United Auto Workers attorneys, calling Milwaukee Spring 1 'a very serious piece
of mischief,' [predicted] that the decision would undermine industrial peace since a
union's bargaining strategy in the future would have to include demands for work pres-
ervation clauses, demands that workers would be inclined to strike over." Marcus, The
NLRB and Milwaukee Spring: The Duty to Bargain over Plant Closings and Relocations, 55
OKLA. B.J. 709, 714 (1984) (quoting Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1984, at 3, col. 4).
61 This assumes that the stay clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See infra
note 94.
62 See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
63 See supra note 7.
64 See Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, I J. LEGAL SmUD. 223,
224 (1972) ("There can be little doubt that a specific court decision will alter the distri-
bution of wealth between the contending parties; that, after all, is the main motivation
for litigation.").
65 Id. at 229 ("[T]he essential condition for a reassignment of rights to alter the
distribution of wealth is that the persons whose activities interact must have engaged in
these activities through contractual obligations whose terms are incongruous in light of
the new rule of liability.").
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express relocation clauses became better off and employees became
worse off. Employers who had not bargained for an express reloca-
tion clause were suddenly free to transfer work during the contract
term with no simultaneous adjustment of the wage. Conversely,
workers no longer were protected by an implicit stay clause. The
Board rule thus directly affected the distribution of welfare in the
short run.
The more difficult question is whether a Board decision chang-
ing the legal rule permanently alters the distribution of wealth. Re-
call the bargaining example discussed above. Under Milwaukee I, the
union had two things to sell: labor and its security entitlement. The
example suggested that the final contract might include an $8 wage
and a stay clause. Under Milwaukee II, the union has only its labor to
sell and must bargain forjob security. In that situation, I suggested
that the final contract might include a $6.50 wage and an explicit
stay clause. Because Milwaukee 11 gives the company more bargain-
ing chips, the parties might settle upon a lower wage than under
Milwaukee I, even if the stay clause will appear in the contract under
either Board rule. Professor Coase asserted in his original article
that entitlements affect the distribution of welfare between the par-
ties, at least in a tort setting. 66 That analysis might suggest that
wages will be lower under Milwaukee II because the union must
"buy" the company's right to leave by agreeing to lower wages.
Later analysts, however, have suggested that in a contract set-
ting where all terms are negotiable, initial entitlements should not
affect distribution.67 When a legal rule regulates only one term of a
multifaceted bargain and allows parties voluntarily to reassign the
entitlement, the law's power over the distribution of wealth between
the parties is limited. For example, if the parties previously relied
on silence in the contract, presuming that courts would construe it
in a particular way, then the parties can simply include an express
clause in their next contract if the law changes its interpretation of
66 Coase, supra note 3, at 2-8.
67 Professor Demsetz illustrates the point with an example involving industrial acci-
dents. Suppose that employers in a competitive labor market initially are not liable for
industrial accidents. Workers will demand a wage that compensates them not only for
the value of their labor, but also for the expected costs of accidents suffered on the job.
Assume that the parties agree to a wage of$10 an hour, a wage that includes $2 an hour
to cover expected accident costs. If the liability rule changes, and employers must com-
pensate employees for their on-the-job injuries, then the wage rate will be reduced to $8
an hour. Neither the workers nor the firms will be worse off, because the employees
receive $8 an hour in wages and $2 an hour in accident insurance coverage provided by
the employer. Thus, there is no redistribution of wealth. Demsetz, supra note 64; Dem-
setz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL SrUD. 13, 22 (1972) [hereinafter
Demsetz, Rule of Liability]; see also D. LESLIE, supra note 4, at 370-72 (distribution of
wealth is not affected by initial assignment of entitlements because parties will bargain
until entitlements are in hands of those who value them most).
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silence. This reestablishes the original allocation of entitlements
and leaves the distribution of wealth undisturbed.
A non-unionized, competitive labor market most clearly shows
law's inability to affect the distribution of wealth.68 First, suppose a
competitive labor market operates under a Milwaukee I-like rule.69 If
the individual worker's contract says nothing about job security, the
firm cannot replace the worker during the contract term with some-
one willing to work for less.70 If workers value job security more
than employers value the freedom to change workers, the parties
will not alter the presumption ofjob security. Suppose the equilib-
rium wage is $6.71 Firms earn normal profits with wages at this level
and there is no net increase or decrease in the number of firms or
workers.
Now suppose the legal entitlement shifts to a Milwaukee !!-like
rule, so that firms may replace employees with cheaper workers if
they so desire. Workers must bargain to obtain the same job protec-
tion as before. Initially, workers may have to work for a lower wage
to induce firms to waive their right to terminate. Employees are
now worse off and firms are better off. But with the same job pro-
tection and lower wages, firms would make excess profits. These
profits induce new firms to enter the market. Competition for work-
ers generated by entering firms eventually raises the wage to its pre-
vious level of $6. When equilibrium is restored, the position of
workers is the same as it was originally (with job security and a $6
wage) and firms are once again earning normal profits. The change
in legal rule did not alter the long-term distribution of wealth in the
competitive market.
68 Professor Leslie has shown an analogous example that, given a competitive
plumber market, a law requiring households to give plumbers a free cup of coffee does
not change the net cost to households of plumbers' services. The money wage house-
holds are willing to pay plumbers decreases by an amount just equal to the cost of pro-
viding coffee. D. LESLIE, supra note 4, at 370.
69 In a competitive labor market, a single union does not bargain with a single em-
ployer. Rather, numerous employers and employees buy and sell labor. Each worker
has an individual contract specifying the wage and the contract duration, and possibly
restricting the conditions under which an employer may discharge the employee during
the contract term in order to hire another worker at a lower wage. I earlier assumed that
an individual contract in a non-union labor market could not provide job security, be-
cause Milwaukee I & II applies only to collective bargaining contracts. Thus, this section
refers to a Milwaukee I-like rule, rather than a Milwaukee I rule.
70 In this example, replacing the original worker with someone willing to work for
less is analogous to relocating production in Milwaukee I & II.
71 I assume that each worker values a stay clause more than any firm values a go
clause. A more complex market might have two sorts of firms distinguished by the kind
of employment contract they offer. Firms that value a go clause highly would offer em-
ployment without job security and attract workers who care little about a stay clause.
Firms that attach little value to a go clause would employ workers who value a stay
clause.
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In a unionized setting, the question remains whether initial en-
titlements affect the distribution of wealth. For example, suppose
under Milwaukee I a strong union threatened a crushing strike and
thereby obtained a high wage, capturing most of the company's ex-
tra-normal profits. After Milwaukee 1H the same strong union will
threaten the same crushing strike and obtain a high wage plus an
express clause counteracting the Milwaukee 11 rule. Under this view,
then, the initial legal entitlement affects neither efficiency nor
distribution. 72
On the other hand, the legal rule will have a long-term effect on
wealth distribution of the parties if it affects their relative bargaining
strength.7 3 This view has some merit in labor negotiations because,
unlike the participants in competitive markets, 74 the company and
the union cannot easily turn elsewhere if negotiations break down.75
Even a strong union cannot go elsewhere if a company refuses to
72 This situation differs from one where the legal rule fixes one aspect of the bar-
gain and does not allow the entitlement holder to waive the entitlement. In that case,
the legal rule may create inefficiencies that may leave both sides worse 6ff. The classic
example is a housing code that mandates a specific level of habitability. This law pre-
vents landlords from offering low rent/low quality housing, which arguably hurts ten-
ants as well as landlords. Compare Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of
the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE LJ.
1093 (1971) with Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique ofthe Ackerman Analysis of Housing
Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE LJ. 1175 (1973). See also Heskin, The Warranty of
Habitability Debate: A California Case Study, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 37 (1978); Markovits, The
Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some
Theoretical Claifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976).
73 For a general discussion of the factors influencing relative bargaining power in
the collective bargaining process, see Leap & Grigsby, A Conceptualization of Collective Bar-
gaining Power, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 202 (1986).
74 The parties may be bargaining under competitive constraints. For example, a
firm in a competitive product market will be disadvantaged if its labor costs exceed those
of its competitors. As long as labor costs are within this cap, the firm and its unionized
work force are free to negotiate the components of labor costs (e.g., whether the firm
will promise high wages or job security). See Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 375 (1984)
("Within the limits of what is judged to be an appropriate and affordable increase in
global compensation, the negotiators of a labor contract must grapple with a broad
range of concerns of both workers and management, and must fashion a web of rules
that will govern relations in the workplace for the next two or three years.").
75 See M. STONE, MANAGERIAL FREEDOM AND JOB SECURITY 4 (1964) (Unlike other
contracts, "labor and management can never escape one another; both are under obliga-
tions imposed by law, by self-interest, and by the very nature of their relationship to
bargain until they do reach agreement."); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1958) ("In fact neither the employer nor the employ-
ees collectively have the freedom to disagree which characterizes typical contracts be-
tween business firms and individuals. Sooner or later the employer and employees must
strike some kind of a bargain."); Summers, supra note 22, at 530 ("Selection of a major-
ity union establishes a bargaining relationship which is compulsory for both the em-
ployer and all individual employees."); Weiler, supra note 74, at 366 (labor law assumes
that employer and union must eventually reach some contract). Nonetheless, almost
one quarter of first-contract negotiations fail to reach agreement. See Cooke, The Failure
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waive its entitlement without some compensation. Because the
union has few, if any, employment alternatives, it may sign a con-
tract that implicitly allocates the entitlement to the company, or it
may reduce its demands on other contract terms in exchange for the
entitlement. This implies that a party bargains from a stronger posi-
tion when it holds the entitlement.76
Ultimately, whether the assignment of entitlements affects the
long-run relative welfare of unions and firms is not the primary fo-
cus of the Coase Theorem. The Theorem is primarily a prediction
that unions and firms will negotiate an efficient bargain regardless
of the assignment of entitlements. The Theorem does not predict
whether initial entitlements alter the distribution of the surplus
from bargains. Until empirical studies reveal more about actual bar-
gaining results, one should remain somewhat agnostic about the
long-run distributive effects of initial entitlements. 77
to Negotiate First Contracts: Determinants and Policy Implications, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
163, 164 (1985).
76 Professor Leslie, while accepting the argument that legal entitlements will not
affect distribution in competitive markets, suggests that legal entitlements will some-
times affect distribution in "the special case of union/management collective bargain-
ing." D. LESLIE, supra note 4, at 371. Suppose, suggests Leslie, the union's valuation of
the entitlement exceeds its minimum settlement point had the Board not awarded it this
entitlement. If managers cannot injure the union and thereby force the union to give
back the asset, the Board's decision will redistribute wealth from managers to the union.
77 Indeed, the efficiency prediction of the Coase Theorem should likewise not be
accepted as dogma, but rather as a hypothesis capable of empirical testing. Some exper-
imental evidence supports the Coase Theorem. See Harrison & McKee, Experimental
Evaluation of The Coase Theorem, 28J.L. & ECON. 653 (1985) (efficient outcomes reached in
over 977% of experimental trials designed to test various aspects of Coase Theorem);
Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982)
[hereinafter Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests] (subjects in two- and three-person
bargaining games reached efficient outcomes in nearly 90% of trials even though one
person held entitlement enabling that person to control outcome of experiment); Hoff-
man & Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Con-
cepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985) (subjects in experiment where
cooperation was possible consistently chose efficient outcomes even though one party
was entitled unilaterally to choose suboptimal outcome that guaranteed that party larger
reward); Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests of the Coase Theorem with Large Bargaining
Groups, 15 J. LEGAL SrUD. 149 (1986) (experimental bargaining with large number of
parties and imperfect information resulted in efficient outcome in over 90% of trials
regardless of which party held entitlement). A more skeptical view is taken by Ellickson,
Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV.
623 (1986).
Some econometric studies by labor economists examine whether collective bargain-
ing agreements are in fact efficient. See Ashenfelter & Brown, Testing the Efficiency of Em-
ployment Contracts, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 840 (Supp. 1986) (unable conclusively to reject
hypothesis that collective bargaining agreements are efficient; although, based upon
preliminary evidence, agreements appear inefficient); MaCurdy & Pencavel, Testing Be-
tween Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets, 94 J. POL.
ECON. S3 (Supp. 1986) (hypothesis that contract negotiations between union and man-
agement lead to efficient outcomes cannot be rejected on basis of econometric evi-
dence); Pencavel, The Tradeoff Between Wages and Employment in Trade Union Objectives, 99
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III
CRITICISMS OF THE COASE MODEL
Industrial peace justifications for labor law are irrelevant only if
the Coase Theorem is correct in predicting that the parties will
reach an efficient contract regardless of the Board rule. If the Coase
Theorem is false or incomplete, decisions such as Milwaukee I and 11
can affect efficiency. This section outlines the major criticisms of the
Coase Theorem and assesses their force in the context of labor
negotiations.
I stress at the outset that my point is not that the Coase Theo-
rem applies in all circumstances, but only that it may be more valid
in labor negotiations than in many other contexts. Two characteris-
tics of collective bargaining distinguish it from many other bargain-
ing situations to which Coasean analysis has been applied. First, the
extensive government regulation of labor negotiations-capsulized
in the duty to bargain in "good faith"-may minimize the transac-
tion costs of bargaining. Second, the parties in collective bargaining
have little alternative to bargaining with one another. Once the
Board has certified a union as the bargaining representative, a com-
pany cannot simply leave if negotiations become difficult. Although
individual employees can quit work, they cannot negotiate with the
employer, either individually78 or in small groups. 79
A. Transaction Costs
The most fundamental criticism of the Coase Theorem is that
the assumption of zero transaction costs is inaccurate in most set-
tings. As Coase himself emphasized,80 initial entitlements can affect
final results if bargaining is costly. When transaction costs exceed
the gains from trade, bargainers will not trade resources to their
most valued use.
Obviously the Coasean assumption of zero transaction costs is
stylized, but the Coasean prediction will often remain accurate with
a less extreme assumption. Specifically, transaction costs will not im-
Qj. ECON. 215 (1984) (potentially most inefficient outcome is not reached in collective
bargaining, but not all collective bargaining leads to efficient outcome); H. FARBER, THE
ANALYSIS OF UNION BEHAVIOR 42 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Pa-
per No. 1502, 1984) (Upon review of existing studies, "there is little ... that provides
convincing evidence on the efficiency of labor contracts .....
78 SeeJ. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
79 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (employees may not bargain separately with employer and thereby circumvent
their elected union representatives even when minority employees are bargaining over
discriminatory employment practice issues).
80 See Coase, supra note 3, at 15 ("[T]he assumption.., that there were no costs
involved in carrying out market transactions . . . is, of course, a very unrealistic
assumption.").
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pede efficient bargaining whenever the difference in values that the
union and company place on an item exceeds the costs of bargain-
ing over the item."' For example, under the Milwaukee I and I1 sce-
narios discussed earlier, the company valued a go clause at $1 an
hour while the union valued the stay clause at $2 an hour, an aggre-
gate difference of $600,000 over the life of the contract. As long as
the costs of bargaining over a stay/go clause are less than $600,000,
an efficient bargain will result, and the contract will have a stay
clause.8 2
Bargaining costs are likely to be lower in labor negotiations
than in many other settings. The largest impediment to reaching an
efficient agreement, according to many scholars, is coordinating the
desires of multiple parties.8 3 The common example used for this
proposition is that of homeowners bargaining with a factory over air
or water pollution. 4 In a typical labor negotiation, only two parties
bargain. 5 Thus, the most substantial transaction cost is absent
81 See Woj, Property Rights Disputes: Current Fallacies and a New Approach, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 411,412 (1985) ("Where a legal right is vested in the party who values it the least,
a value-maximizing exchange will occur only if the difference in the valuation of the
right between the two parties is greater than the level of transaction costs .... ").
Although transaction costs do not always impede efficient bargains, the initial legal
entitlement allocation does affect efficiency when transaction costs exist. If the law as-
signs the initial entitlement to the party that values it most highly, the costs of bargain-
ing to transfer the right are not incurred, a more efficient result. Nevertheless, the
Coasean prediction that the entitlement will go to its most highly valued use remains
true as long as transaction costs are less than the difference in the parties' valuations.
82 The existence of transaction costs may affect the division of the surplus created
by the bargain. Recall that the Coase Theorem does not predict how the parties will
divide the surplus. Under Milwaukee II, where the union must buy a stay clause from the
company, the union may bear the burden of the transaction costs in the form of a lower
wage.
83 See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment,
11 J.L. & EcoN. 67, 68 n.5 (1968) ("By transaction costs, I have in mind costs like those
of getting large numbers of people together to bargain, and costs of excluding free load-
ers."); Coase, supra note 3, at 18 ("[T]here is no reason why, on occasion .... govern-
mental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic
efficiency ... particularly ... when ... a large number of people are involved and in
which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may
be high."); Daly, The Coase Theorem: Assumptions, Applications and Ambiguities, 12 EcoN. IN-
QUIRY 203, 205 (1974) ("A general consensus seems to exist that market internalization
is least likely when the number of parties involved in the externality relationship is
large.").
84 See, e.g., A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12-14 (1983).
85 The union speaks with a single voice when negotiating with management. The
union negotiator, however, must quell and merge diverse interests among the rank and
file, and often must submit the tentative contract to the rank and file for ratification. See
generally Burke & Rubin, Is Contract Reection a Major Collective Bargaining Problem?, 26 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 820, 833 (1973). Multiemployer bargaining complicates the bar-
gaining process. See Leslie, supra note 4, at 415 ("Because multiemployer bargaining
requires the consent of both union and managers, it is something of a puzzle that it is so
common.").
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when a union and a company bargain.
Other features of labor negotiations reinforce the proposition
that transaction costs are low in collective bargaining. First, the spe-
cific term at issue (in Milwaukee I & II, the stay/go clause) is but one
item of many on the bargaining table. Once the parties are assem-
bled, the marginal cost of discussing an additional item is small.86
Second, in many cases the parties have established a stable, long-
term relationship. Accumulated good will discourages the parties
from bargaining too aggressively over one item in one contract.
The parties may value long-term cooperation more highly than any
individual contract term. Third, the representatives of the union
and the company are typically experienced, skilled negotiators, able
to recognize and react swiftly to cues that agreement or compromise
is possible.
B. Strategic Behavior
I have argued that the one-on-one bargaining of labor negotia-
tions lowers transaction costs. This bilateral monopoly87 can, how-
ever, create incentives for strategic behavior that may produce an
inefficient contract. 88 In a competitive market, an equilibrium price
is set by the bargaining of many individual parties.89 In a bilateral
86 See Cross, Negotiation as a Learning Process ("Multidimensional negotiations may
actually come to settlement earlier than undimensional ones," because "the flow of in-
formation between the negotiators is greatly increased."), in THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
29, 52 (I. Zartman ed. 1978).
87 Bilateral monopoly occurs when there is one seller and one buyer, and neither is
able to go elsewhere if negotiations break down. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THE-
ORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 207 (1961) (bilateral monopoly defined as "single pur-
chaser without competitors buying from a monopolist seller"); J. HENDERSON & R.
QUANDT, MICROECONoMIc THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 223 (3d ed. 1980) ("It
is not possible for the [single] seller to behave as a monopolist and the [single] buyer to
behave as a monopsonist at the same time."). Collective bargaining is often a prime
example of bilateral monopoly. See Leslie, supra note 4, at 364 ("Unionization of a firm
having monopsony power in the labor market creates a bilateral monopoly."). A union
certified by the NLRB has one year from the date of certification before a rival union can
attempt to organize the workers or the members can attempt to decertify the union.
The workers are thus locked into their representatives for that year. In addition, work-
ers often have difficulty changing jobs. Once they have acquired firm-specific skills, al-
ternative jobs seem less attractive. Similarly, firms may not have attractive alternatives
to negotiating with the certified union. Among other things, fixed capital investments
may impede mobility. Of course, an article whose major example involves bargaining
over a firm's right to move should not overemphasize the firm's immobility.
88 Some writers treat strategic behavior as an element of transaction costs. How-
ever, the term "transaction costs" is not well standardized in the literature. Cooter,
supra note 53, at 16. I separate the concepts for clarity. Strategic behavior can occur
even when the costs of communicating, transferring the right, and enforcing the bargain
are negligible. For discussions of the possible elements of transaction costs, see id. and
Calabresi, supra note 83.
89 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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monopoly, no clear price exists, enabling a party through threats or
lies to capture for itself most of the gains from trade. To gain a
larger share, one party may threaten destructive behavior.90 As
long as the other side recognizes the threat, however, the parties
can negotiate based on the fear of destructive behavior without any-
one having to carry out the threat.91 Thus, bluffs and threats by
themselves do not cause inefficiency. Only when strategic behavior
actually prevents trade will it prevent efficient contracts.
Inefficiency does occur, however, when one side cannot back
down after its bluff is called, and the parties fail to transfer the item
to its most valued use.92 Indeed, commentators often cite labor
strikes as an example of strategic behavior leading to inefficient bar-
gaining. 93 For example, suppose Milwaukee 1I controls (that is, silent
agreements are presumed to include a go clause) but the union val-
ues a stay clause more than the company values the right to go. The
Coase Theorem predicts that the company will trade the Milwaukee
I1 right to the union. Suppose the company takes a tough bargain-
ing stance, however, insisting on the rock-bottom wage of $4.01 in
exchange for its right to a go clause. The union may call the com-
pany's bluff by striking.94 A strike is usually inefficient because em-
90 See Mumey, The "Coase Theorem" A Reexamination, 85 QOJ. ECON. 718, 720 (1971)
(Although the initial assumption of no transaction costs implies that threats can be com-
municated without costs, "the economic incentive for inventing a threatening produc-
tion needs to be recognized .... It is difficult to believe that, given this possibility for
gain, real resources would not be used for development of credible plans for threatening
processes. Hence, there is a strong case for believing that resource use would be dis-
torted in a Coase-unregulated environment, even if bargains for abstention themselves
were consummated costlessly.").
91 ProfessorJaffe makes this point in response to Professor Mumey's argument that
real resources will go into producing threats. "Thus, in an economy without legal liabil-
ity, we would expect the individuals to pay and receive bribes based on the potential to
invent tools that make threats credible. No resources would actually be employed to the
invention of these implements. All actual production would be devoted to socially valu-
able activities." Jaffe, The "Coase Theorem'" A Reexamination-Comment, 89 QJ. ECON. 660,
661 (1975).
92 See Cooter, supra note 53, at 20 (when sincere threat is taken as bluff, inefficient
outcome occurs); Regan, supra note 47, at 429 ("[W]henever a threat is carried out, the
outcome... will be sub-optimal .... ).
93 Consider the poetic paragraph of Nobel laureateJ.R. Hicks in his classic work on
labor:
Weapons grow rusty if unused.... The most able Trade Union leader-
ship will embark on strikes occasionally, not so much to secure greater
gains upon that occasion (which are not very likely to result) but in order
to keep their weapon burnished for future use, and to keep employers
thoroughly conscious of the Union's power.
J.R. HICKs, THE THEORY OF WAGES 146 (2d ed. 1963).
94 The union can lawfully strike in support of its position only if the clause in dis-
pute is a mandatory subject of bargaining. R. GORMAN, supra note 14, at 496-98. The
Board has declared that the decision to relocate because of labor costs is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984). If the union's pro-
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ployees on the picket line would prefer to be working for a
wage/stay clause package that the company is willing to pay. For a
time, at least, the parties are avoiding an efficient bargain by strug-
gling to divide the spoils of a surplus-creating agreement.
Even when a strike occurs, the Coase prediction of efficient bar-
gains may be accurate. If the parties resolve the strike by including
the most valued clause in the contract, efficiency will result despite
the strategic behavior. For example, in Milwaukee I and II, the
Coasean prediction of efficiency occurs when the parties agree to a
stay clause, whether or not the union "wins" the strike. Suppose, as
in the initial Milwaukee I and II example, the union values the stay
clause more than the firm values the go clause. If the firm bluffs that
it will never accept a stay clause, the union may counteroffer with a
rock-bottom wage. As a result, the strike is averted but the firm
gains nearly the entire surplus from the trade. Alternatively, if the
union strikes and prevails, the firm will agree to a stay clause and
also pay high wages. In each scenario, the stay clause exists, fulfil-
ling the Coasean prediction. Only if the initial bluff ("I will never
agree to a stay clause") is called, and the parties cannot transform
the issue into a tradeoff with other items ("I will agree to a stay
clause only in return for a rock-bottom wage"), will strategic behav-
ior prevent the parties from agreeing on the higher-valued stay
clause.
Despite the obvious presence of strikes,95 labor negotiations
may have less problems with strategic behavior than do many other
bargaining situations under bilateral monopoly. A major purpose of
labor law is to prevent the breakdown of negotiations and en-
courage agreement. Unlike most other bargainers, labor negotia-
tors are under a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. The parties
cannot burn bridges or engage in other absolutist tactics, but must
remain flexible.96 One can question the effectiveness of the Board
posed clause will prevent the company from moving during the contract term for rea-
sons other than labor costs, the clause may be only a permissible subject of bargaining
and thus not subject to a strike.
95 As argued above, some level of strike activity is necessary in our system of collec-
tive bargaining and thus is consistent with the goals of industrial peace and metaef-
ficiency. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Even if one regards all strikes as
absolutely inefficient, their quantitative importance is minor. For example, in the United
States in 1980, strikes caused the loss of only .14% of total working days. Labor-Manage-
ment Data, MoNTHLY LAB. REv., Apr. 1982, at 107 (table 37). For a discussion of the
significance of strikes in the American economy, see Weiler, supra note 74, at 367-71.
96 See, e.g., NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding com-
pany's strategy of Boulwareism, or painting itself into a corner on all bargainable mat-
ters, to violate duty to bargain in good faith), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970); NLRB v.
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir. 1953) ("[IThe employer is
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in mandating good faith negotiations, 97 but even the Board's incom-
plete supervision of the good faith requirement may make strategic
behavior less problematic in labor negotiations than in other bilat-
eral monopoly contexts. 98
In addition to the short-term inefficiency caused by threats,
strategic considerations can create inefficiencies by inducing negoti-
ators to lie,99 even if lying shrinks the overall size of the pie.100 To
create the maximum surplus, parties must reveal their true prefer-
ences to ensure that every item goes to the party who values it the
most. But if one party convincingly underrepresents the value it at-
taches to an item, it may capture a larger share of the surplus. Re-
turning to the Milwaukee II example, suppose the union convinces
the company that it would trade, at most, $1.50 in wage reduction
for a stay clause. In fact, the union is willing to accept a $2 wage
reduction to obtain a stay clause. Having been duped, the company
is unlikely to demand $1.75 for its go clause, even though the union
would, if pressed, accept such a demand. In general, then, a trade-
off exists between revealing true preferences to create maximum so-
cietal surplus, and lying in order to grab the largest possible portion
obliged to make some reasonable effort in some direction to compose his differences with
the union, if § 8(a)(5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all.").
Some empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of Board orders to bargain in
good faith. One survey revealed that, after a Board finding of bad faith and a remedial
order, unions and employers established a successful bargaining relationship in 75% of
the cases. P. Ross, THE GOVERNMENT AS A SOURCE OF UNION POWER 180-230 (1965); see
also McCulloch, The Development of Administrative Remedies, 14 LAB. LJ. 339, 348 (1963).
97 Many labor scholars question whether the good faith bargaining requirement has
had any effect on a recalcitrant employer not wishing to settle with the union. See LABOR
STUDY GROUP, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 82 (Committee for Eco-
nomic Development 1961) ("Basically, it is unrealistic to expect that, by legislation,
'good faith' can be brought to the bargaining table."). See generally Cox, The Duty to Bar-
gain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958) (good faith requires that employers
negotiate sincerely, it does not require reasonable concessions); Gross, Cullen & Han-
slowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (1968)
(imposition of good faith requirement of little value to aggrieved parties).
98 Cooter postulates a dichotomy between the Coase Theorem and its polar oppo-
site, the Hobbes Theorem. The Coase Theorem assumes that the parties will reach an
efficient bargain unless transaction costs are high. The Hobbes Theorem assumes that
parties' worst threats against each other will materialize unless a third party exists to
coerce both of them. Accordingly, the Hobbes Theorem suggests that the role of law is
to maximize the likelihood of efficient bargains by restricting the threats which the par-
ties can make against each other. Cooter, supra note 53, at 18-19. If labor law fulfills the
role envisioned by the Hobbes Theorem, the question becomes whether, given that the
NLRB encourages bargains including those that contract around individual Board hold-
ings, the Coase prediction is plausible.
99 I distinguish a threat from a lie: a threat is a statement about the consequences if
the other side does not give the threatening party what it honestly wants; a lie falsely
states what the party wants.
100 Professor Saraydar has introduced an interesting mathematical model demon-
strating this effect. See Saraydar, Bargaining Power, Dissimulation, and the Coase Theorem, 139
ZEITSCHRIFr FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 599 (1983).
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of the surplus. 0 1 If parties follow the latter strategy, they may con-
tradict the Coasean prediction that parties always reach efficient
bargains.
The critical question, though, is whether the choice of legal rule
affects parties' incentive to lie. Professor Leslie suggests Board
rules might have this effect.' 0 2 For example, under Milwaukee I the
union has an initial entitlement to a stay clause. It may be able to
understate its valuation of a stay clause and still retain it. Under
Milwaukee 11 the union must purchase a stay clause and in the pro-
cess may be forced to reveal its true valuation ofjob security. Ifjob
security is a factor throughout the contract, the union may be forced
to forego a stay clause in order to preserve the strategic advantage
of understating its preferences on job security. Under this "prefer-
ence exposure theory,"1 03 the Board rule may affect efficiency.
Two factors mitigate the problem of strategic lying in labor ne-
gotiations. First, labor law attempts to minimize strategic tactics by
prohibiting lying during contract negotiations. 10 4 Second, tradeoff
between maximum surplus and maximum share occurs only when
the parties bargain over items that they can divide between them. In
labor negotiations, many contract terms are either/or choices. For
example, in Milwaukee II, if the union understates its preferences so
that a go clause appears more valuable than a stay clause, 0 5 it has
destroyed any incentive to bargain. No surplus is created, mooting
the fight over dividing it.106
101 For a more general discussion of the tension between maximizing mutual gain
(the integrative bargaining problem) and maximizing one's share (the distributive bar-
gaining problem), see R. WALTON & R. MCKERSIE, supra note 47, at 161-83.
102 D. LESLIE, supra note 4, at 373.
103 Id.
104 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) ("Good-faith bargaining
necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims.").
Labor law's prohibition on lying during contract negotiations can be overstated. The
rule is useful in giving the union information to evaluate the credibility of management's
claims about the impact of wages or other monetary items on profitability. However, the
rule is less useful in helping the union evaluate the company's valuation of nonmonetary
items. Thus the value the company places on the freedom to avoid union wages during
the contract term if other opportunities arise cannot easily be verified. An important
example is the statement "we will never agree to that," which never carries a disclosure
duty, even if it is a lie.
105 If Milwaukee I is the controlling law (i.e., the union has the initial entitlement),
the union has an incentive to overstate its valuation of a stay clause while the company
has an incentive to understate its valuation of a go clause.
106 The union may initially understate the value it places on a stay clause in order to
detect the minimum price the company is willing to demand for relinquishing its Milwau-
kee H right. Alternatively, the union may initially overstate the value of a stay clause in
order to determine the maximum price the company will pay for the union's Milwaukee I
right. But the union will not gain from lying if a go clause appears in the contract. Un-
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C. The Invariance Thesis
The Coase Theorem, as I have described it, predicts not only
that bargainers will reach an efficient result (the efficiency thesis),
but also that bargainers will reach the same efficient result (the in-
variance thesis), regardless of the distribution of initial entitlements.
At least six scholars have supported the invariance thesis10 7 and as
many have rejected it. 108 The critics argue that the efficient out-
come depends on initial entitlements. They would say that, in our
example, the parties may value the stay clause more highly under
Milwaukee I even though the same parties may value the go clause
more highly under Milwaukee II. Even if the efficient bargain occurs
under both rules, the contract under Milwaukee I will have a stay
clause and the contract under Milwaukee 11 will have a go clause.
The invariance thesis is not crucial to the main argument
presented here. 109 If the efficiency thesis is accurate, and union and
management will reach an efficient result regardless of initial entitle-
ment, the Board cannot affect efficiency or promote industrial
peace. Unless the invariance thesis is also true, however, the
Board's rule will affect the percentage of contracts with stay clauses.
If the Board cares about stay clauses for some nonefficiency reason,
it would be justified in considering the effect of its decision on final
less the union is caught in its initial lie, it will not mislead the company into rejecting a
stay clause.
The analysis differs if intermediate solutions are possible. Intermediate solutions in
the Milwaukee I and 11 cases may include a contractual promise by the company to give
severance pay or 90 days notice before transferring work. See W. WENDLING, supra note
58, at 106-18. In this scenario, the union may want to understate the value of a stay
clause (e.g., "we only need 75 days notice rather than 90 days"), thereby producing a
less than optimal stay clause but capturing more of the surplus.
107 Demsetz, supra note 64; Demsetz, Rule of Liability, supra note 67; Frech, Pricing of
Pollutions: The Coase Theorem in the Long Run, 4 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 316 (1973);
Gifford & Stone, Externalities, Liability and the Coase Theorem: A Mathematical Analysis, 11 W.
ECON. J. 260 (1973); Starrett & Zeckhauser, Treating External Diseconomies-Markets or
Taxes?, in STATISTICAL AND MATHEMATICAL AsPECrS OF POLLUTION PROBLEMS 65 (J. Pratt
ed. 1974).
108 Bramhall & Mills, A Note on the Asymmetry Between Fees and Bribes, 2 WATER RE-
SOURCES RES. 615 (1966); Cooter, supra note 53; Regan, supra note 47; Schulze & d'Arge,
The Coase Proposition, Information Constraints, and Long Run Equilibrium, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
730 (1974); Tybout, Pricing Pollution and Other Negative Externalities, 3 BELL. J. EcoN. &
MGMT. Sci. 252 (1972).
Guido Calabresi initially challenged the invariance thesis, but later supported it.
Compare Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78
HARV. L. REV. 713, 730-31 (1965) with Calabresi, supra note 83, at 68.
109 Economists are often not interested in the invariance claim, because the funda-
mental economic question is whether a certain market or legal rule will be efficient. The
economist leaves to others the decision of which of several efficient outcomes to favor.
The Board is one of the "others" who, in establishing a rule, must choose between
efficient outcomes. If the alternatives are each efficient, the Board must use nonef-
ficiency criteria for its choice.
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outcomes. It is thus worth exploring whether the invariance thesis
of the Coase Theorem is valid in labor negotiations.
The invariance thesis is subject to two basic attacks. The first,
which is less valid here, emphasizes that in the long run resources
may switch toward the activity that the legal rule favors. The sec-
ond, which is more troubling in the context of labor relations, ar-
gues that legal rules can influence the way a union or management
values various clauses in the contract.
1. Long-Run Effects of Legal Rules
The first criticism of the invariance thesis emphasizes that, in
the long run, competitive markets cause resources to switch to activ-
ities earning extra-normal profits."10 Suppose that under a particu-
lar legal rule the market reaches a competitive equilibrium, meaning
that the marginal firms are not earning profits."'I In Coase's classic
example of farmers and ranchers," 2 marginal farmers and ranchers
are earning no profits. If the initial entitlement allows ranchers to
graze their cattle on unfenced land, some farmers may pay ranchers
not to graze cattle in their unfenced cornfields. When the legal rule
changes and prevents grazing in cornfields, a rancher will no longer
receive these payments but instead must pay the farmer for the corn
damaged by his cattle. In the short run, changing the entitlement
leaves land use unaffected. Ranchers will pay to graze on farmland
only if the benefit from grazing exceeds the damage to the corn.
Critics of the invariance thesis argue, however, that over time re-
sources will shift from ranching to farming. Only ranchers previ-
ously earning rents sufficient to cover the necessary payments to
farmers will remain as ranchers." 3 Marginal ranchers, unable to
make these payments, will leave the industry. In addition, after the
entitlement switches to farmers, they will earn additional profits as
they receive payments rather than make them. In the long run, the
extra-normal profits will induce landowners to switch to farming to
cash in on the favorable legal rule. Such a reallocation would invali-
date the invariance prediction of the Coase Theorem that legal enti-
tlements do not affect resource allocation.
In an insightful article, Professor Frech has explained that the
110 For a brief, general discussion, see Zerbe, supra note 3, at 88-89.
111 Inframarginal firms may be earning rents on factors that other firms cannot repli-
cate (e.g., excellent farm land).
112 E.g., Coase, supra note 3, at 2-8.
113 But see Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Social Costs: A Footnote, 11 J.L. & ECON. 503,
507 (1968) (justifying invariance claim by suggesting that ranchers would simply enjoy
lesser rents, but would still prefer ranching to farming, after entitlement switches to
favor farmers). As Professor Regan noted, however, assuming rents sufficient to cover
payments creates a special case. Regan, supra note 47, at 433.
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divergent views on the invariance thesis result from commentators'
analyzing dissimilar things. 114 The invariance thesis is valid when
examining shifting property entitlements because such shifts will
not induce entry, but not when examining shifting rules of liability,
which will induce entry. The significant distinction is that property
entitlements include the right to exclude others from sharing the
entitlement. Therefore, new firms will not benefit from the shift.
Under liability rules, anyone harmed by the conflicting use, includ-
ing entrants, can collect damages. Therefore, new firms will enter
the market when a liability entitlement shifts and existing firms are
making extra-normal profits. 115
Because legal rules concerning collective bargaining contract
interpretation are more akin to property rights than liability rules,
the invariance critics' argument does not apply to labor negotia-
tions. The NLRA grants a specific union an exclusive right to bar-
gain for the workers in a particular unit. Once a union is in place,
rival unions cannot organize the unit in order to benefit from a
switch in legal rule. For example, Milwaukee I grants a stay clause
only to unions that have organized a unit and signed a contract with
the company. After Milwaukee I, unions may attempt to organize
non-union firms to benefit from Milwaukee I. But only if Milwaukee I
enhances the power of unions-a proposition about which I earlier
expressed doubt-will the legal rule affect the entry of unions.
Without entry, this criticism of the Coase Theorem is inapplicable.
2. Wealth Effects and Backward Steps
The second criticism of the invariance thesis emphasizes that
legal rules influence the parties' valuations of contract clauses. If
so, the legal rule affects which clause is the most highly valued, or
efficient, clause. When the legal rule changes, the efficient outcome
changes. In support of this criticism, Professor Kelman argues that
initial legal entitlements affect the values that bargainers place on
goods' 16 because people treat "opportunity cost" income differ-
114 Frech, The Extended Coase Theorem and Long Run Equilibrium: The Nonequivalence of
Liability Rules and Property Rights, 17 EcON. INQUIRY 254 (1979); see also Zerbe, supra note
3, at 87-90 (sense in which Coase Theorem is true depends on underlying assumptions
about allocation of property rights).
115 In the rancher/farmer example, a rule preventing grazing in cornfields is a liabil-
ity rule if the court will award damages to any farmer, including a new entrant. The rule
is a property right if the court will award damages only to farmers in existence when the
rule was enacted or to persons who bought the right to collect damages from one of
those farmers. See Frech, supra note 114, at 265-66. Frech draws his distinction of prop-
erty and liability rules from Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
116 Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52
S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979). Kelman's argument is a general one and does not specifically
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ently from "received" or "realized" income. If Kelman's armchair
psychology is correct, a union with an implicit stay clause under Mil-
waukee I will demand more from the company to waive its right than
it will be willing to pay the company to obtain a stay clause under
Milwaukee 11.117 Thus, Board decisions may affect the parties' valua-
tion of the stay or go clause and ultimately influence the percentage
of stay or go clauses in contracts.
The standard response to this argument is that, to the extent
Kelman is correct, he has identified wealth effects."18 Milwaukee I
gives the union a valuable entitlement to keep or sell. Thus, work-
ers are wealthier under Milwaukee I than Milwaukee II, and wealthier
workers are able and willing to pay more for job security than are
poorer workers.1 9 After reducing Kelman's argument to an obser-
vation about wealth effects, his critics note that wealth effects are
often insignificant. 120
Even when wealth effects are significant, the invariance thesis
may hold if the entitlement, as often occurs in labor law, is an
either/or choice. For example, in the Milwaukee I & 11 situation, the
contract either gives the company the right to go or requires it to
refer to labor negotiations. According to Kelman, parties demand more to release
something they already have than they are willing to pay to purchase something new.
Kelman's criticism goes well beyond the Coase Theorem, for he attacks the general eco-
nomic assumption that people equate foregone opportunity costs with out-of-pocket
costs.
117 Id. at 678-95; see also Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of
Liberal Political Imagination, 97 HARV. L. REV. 475, 489 n.70 (1983) (Different bargaining
outcomes occur if "a union demanded more to be 'bought out' than it offered in 'con-
cessions,' ... over a particular decision. If the union is powerful enough to back up its
bargaining demands through a strike or a threat of strike, this divergence of offer and
asking prices seems likely."). Economists refer to this phenomenon as the difference
between compensating and equivalent variations. See Zerbe, supra note 3, at 85.
118 See Spitzer & Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology
in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1198-99 (1980). Spitzer and Hoffman add
that asymmetrical information and risk aversion may also explain why people sometimes
treat realized and opportunity-cost income differently.
119 In technical terms, ifjob security is a normal good, a worker will buy more of it
as her income increases. At some point, as a consumer's wealth increases, most normal
goods become inferior goods. In the Milwaukee I & 11 example, very wealthy workers
may be less concerned with job security than others are and therefore demand less. The
discussion in the text assumes that unionized workers are willing to pay more for job
security as their income increases-i.e., that job security is a normal good in their in-
come range.
120 Many Coase Theorem analysts include an obligatory footnote waiving away the
problem of wealth effects. See, e.g., Demsetz, Rule of Liability, supra note 67, at 15 n.3. A
parable in the law and economics literature frequently used to demonstrate the signifi-
cance of wealth effects is that of two people in the desert with one barrel of water. Who
will drink most of the water depends on who has the initial right to the water. Mishan,
Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 255 (1967). For less impor-
tant entitlements, presumably the wealth effects are smaller.
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stay; the company cannot go a little way. 121 In an either/or situa-
tion, wealth effects must substantially change the parties' valuations
before a switch in legal rule alters the most valued or efficient out-
come. Suppose that under Milwaukee I the union values the stay
clause more highly than the company values a go clause. Under Mil-
waukee II, if Kelman is correct, the union will value the stay clause
(that it now does not have) less than it did before. Nevertheless, the
union may still value the stay clause more than the company values a
go clause. If so, the legal rule does not alter the efficient outcome
even though the rule affects the parties' valuations. When the dif-
ference in the parties' valuations is large, changes from wealth ef-
fects are unlikely to affect bargaining outcomes.
Beyond wealth effects, Kelman's argument is troubling in an-
other way. His assertion that a union demands more to relinquish a
right than it will pay to obtain a right sounds similar to the rallying
cry of many unions, "No Backward Steps." 122 Under this strategy,
once the union receives an entitlement, it will not relinquish it even
in return for higher wages. Thus, if Milwaukee I controls, the union
will never agree to sell its stay clause. Under Milwaukee II, according
to this logic, the union may refuse to buy a stay clause by agreeing
to lower wages. If the union follows a "no backward steps" policy, a
change in the legal rule might affect the outcome of contract negoti-
ations. The invariance thesis of the Coase Theorem would then be
wrong.
Whatever its strength in the abstract, the practical force of the
"no backward steps" argument is limited. First, this strategy may be
a bargaining tactic rather than an ultimatum. The union's supposed
intransigence may simply represent a gambit intended to obtain a
higher price for waiving its legal right. Second, the union may not
consider agreeing to a pro-management relocation clause under
Milwaukee I a backward step. The only thing traded away is an im-
plicit, unwritten right to a stay clause. Prior contracts may have con-
sistently given the firm these rights. Prior contracts, rather than
initial legal entitlements, may be the benchmark for determining
whether union negotiators have made backward steps. Third, the
union can emphasize the gains in higher wages or other benefits in
return for not insisting on its legal entitlement. 123 The more these
121 Intermediate solutions might exist. See supra note 106.
122 See S. ALINSKY, JOHN L. LEWxS: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 368 (1949) (John
L. Lewis often used "no backward steps" phrase during 1920s).
123 Cf. Miner, Concession Bargaining, 59 CHi.[-]KENT L. REV. 981, 982 (1983)
("Although much attention has been focused upon wage and benefit concessions made
by the unions, frequently such concessions were trade offs in order for the union to
make substantial inroads into areas heretofore considered sacrosanct by manage-
ment."). Professor Leslie suggests that a union may be unable to point to a specific quid
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factors reduce the vitality of the "no backward steps" strategy, the
less likely the strategy is to change the union's valuation when legal
rules change. If the union does not reevaluate terms after legal
rules change, the invariance thesis holds.
D. Imperfect Information Problems
Many formulations of the Coase Theorem require that bargain-
ers have perfect information, 124 including knowledge of available al-
ternatives, prices, and, most critically, of each other's
preferences.125 Many critics of the Coase Theorem think it unrealis-
tic to assume that bargainers have the perfect information required
by the Theorem. Certainly in the Milwaukee I & 1I situation an as-
sumption of perfect information is unrealistic. The stay/go clause is
essentially an insurance clause. The company wants to ensure that a
currently affordable wage bargain will not prove restrictive in the
future. Similarly, the union wants a stay clause to insure against an
uncertain future. Because insurance clauses are predicated on fu-
ture uncertainty, bargaining with perfect information is impossible.
Perfect information, however, is an unnecessary assumption
that makes the Coase prediction uninteresting. 126 If each side knew
how much the other valued each item, bargaining would be infi-
nitely simpler. Searching and signalling about synergies would
evaporate. Parties would know almost automatically what clauses to
put in the contract. Parties would only bargain over dividing the
surplus from trade, and bluffing and lying would be impossible.
The central Coasean prediction that parties search for and achieve
an efficient bargain (i.e., the bargain that awards each item to the
person who values it most highly) would become tediously pro
forma. As long as the parties have sufficient information about al-
ternatives to make informed choices, the Coase Theorem predicts
that the parties will find the highest valued use for each item.
pro quo received in return for relinquishing a statutory entitlement. Under his "batch"
theory, a contract proposal containing many terms is presented to one party, and that
party returns a counterproposal suggesting many changes. In fact, there may be no one
item that is traded for another. Therefore, the union negotiators may hesitate to relin-
quish entitlements because of the difficulty in identifying precisely what they received in
exchange. D. LESLIE, supra note 4, at 372.
124 E.g., Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost. Fifteen Years Later, in THEORY AND MEASURE-
MENT OF EcONOMIc EXTERNALITIES 29 (S. Lin ed. 1976).
125 See, e.g., Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests, supra note 77 (perfect knowledge
of each party's production and profit or utility functions is necessary assumption of
Coase Theorem).
126 See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Ap-
proach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 223 n.6 (1980) (The assumption of perfect knowl-
edge "trivializes the theorem and is stronger than necessary. One need assume only
that the relevant parties have substantial relevant information. Additional pertinent in-
formation is revealed once actual negotiations are underway.").
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In general, the labor laws are designed to alleviate the problem
of inadequate information. When a firm justifies its bargaining posi-
tion during negotiations by claiming an inability to pay, it may be
required to substantiate its claim through financial disclosures.1 27
This rule stems from labor law's explicit requirement of good faith
bargaining. Whether a union negotiating nonmonetary items, such
as a work transfer clause, can demand information on costs and
profits is less clear.1 28
Nevertheless, lack of information may impede efficient labor ne-
gotiations. One complication from imperfect information arises
when one side's valuation depends on the other side's behavior. In
the Milwaukee I & I1 context, for example, the union may be less able
than the company to assess the likelihood that the company will find
more attractive opportunities elsewhere during the three-year con-
tract. This informational asymmetry may prevent the parties from
agreeing on the most efficient clause. Suppose, for a given likeli-
hood that outside opportunities will arise during the three-year con-
tract, 129 a union values job protection more than the company
values flexibility. In such a case, the efficient contract would contain
a stay clause. Because the union cannot independently assess the
likelihood of leaving, however, it must evaluate the stay clause based
on the company's behavior. The union knows that a company will
accede to a minimal wage reduction for a stay clause only when the
company is unlikely to leave. In such a situation, the union may dis-
count the value of such a stay clause and reject it. Such an outcome
undermines the Coasean prediction that parties will always make ef-
ficient contracts.' 30
127 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). But cf Washington Materials,
Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333 (4th Cir. 1986) (company claiming union proposals would
hurt its competitive position not claiming inability to pay and therefore not required to
disclose financial records).
128 Compare Bohemia, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1984) (employer under no duty to
divulge information about non-union plant when union had shown no objective basis,
beyond its good faith suspicion, that employer was transferring work there) with Walter
N. Yoder & Sons v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1985) (union entitled to company
information after establishing sufficient evidence to support reasonable belief that com-
pany was operating non-union shop that was mere alter ego of parent company). See
generally Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A Study
of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (1972)
(examines emerging employer obligation to provide information to employee's bargain-
ing representative).
129 The company can accurately estimate this likelihood, but the union has difficulty
doing so. This creates the informational asymmetry.
130 Economists call this a "lemons" problem, first described by Akerlof, The Market
for "Lemons" Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 488 (1970). See
W. Samuelson, Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 995 (1984), for
an analysis of how inefficient bargains may result from one side having information that
cannot be verified by the other side. Samuelson concludes, "The presence of asymmet-
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This asymmetrical information problem can be overstated,
however. The critical question is whether the placement of the legal
entitlement exacerbates the problem. In the Milwaukee I & II situa-
tion, the value each party places on a stay/go clause depends on its
assessment of the economic health of the industry. The union's as-
sessment may depend on signals it receives from management. But
whether the parties negotiate under the shadow of Milwaukee I or 11
should not affect their valuations. If not, the invariance thesis that
the legal rule does not affect whether a contract will contain a stay or
go clause remains accurate, even though the parties have different
amounts of information.
IV
AN EASIER EXAMPLE-NLRB v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC.
The Milwaukee I & II example presses the limits of Coasean
analysis. Specifically, the wealth effects and imperfect information
problems pose difficulties. This section applies the Coase Theorem
to another important, controversial labor law decision. Here, how-
ever, the Coasean prediction holds more clearly.
In NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. 13l an employee was accused of
theft. She asked that a union representative be present when the
store manager interrogated her. After the manager refused her re-
quest, the union filed a section 8(a)(1) charge. The Board found an
tic information may preclude the attainment of mutually beneficial agreements, even
though profitable exchanges are known to be available ex post." Id. at 1004; see also
Riordan, Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 83
(1984) (considers bilateral monopoly with uncertain and asymmetrical information and
concludes that contracts can be implemented by truthful sequential revelation
mechanism).
131 420 U.S. 251 (1975). The legal development of the Weingarten doctrine has been
troubled and controversial. The Board has rescinded its extension of Weingarten to the
non-union setting. See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985), revg Materials
Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982). Circuit courts have been equally troubled.
See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3d Cir. 1983)
("[Tlhe logic and reasoning of Weingarten carry equal force in the non-union context."),
vacated upon NLRB motion, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984); ITT Lighting Fixtures Div. v.
NLRB, 719 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1983) (Weingarten applies to non-union employee's re-
quest for fellow worker, at least in workplace with history of union organizing or other
group activity); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983)
(request of single non-union employee not concerted activity, but may trigger Weingarten
right if employee acts as part of group); NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d
Cir. 1976) (refusing to enforce Board's unexplained extension of Weingarten to interview
after completed investigation, but noting that NLRA's protection of concerted activities
applies equally to unionized and non-unionized workers). Similar controversy has sur-
rounded the proper remedy for a Weingarten violation. See Taracorp Indus., 273
N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1984) (Board will not order back pay and reinstatement for Wein-
garten violations), overruling Kraft Foods, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 598 (1980). Whether the
union could waive its Weingarten right has also troubled the Board. See infra note 136.
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unfair labor practice, 1 3 2 but the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement. 133
The Supreme Court considered whether the employee had engaged
in protected concerted activity under section 7 of the NLRA by ask-
ing for a union representative at an investigatory interview that she
reasonably believed might result in discipline. The Court held that
the request was protected concerted activity and that the employer
committed an unfair labor practice by denying it.134 Justice Powell
dissented, arguing that an employer, can choose any method to in-
vestigate and discipline an employee, unless it agrees in a collective
bargaining contract to abide by restrictive procedures.135
Weingarten can be viewed as establishing a rebuttable presump-
tion that unionized employees are entitled to have their shop stew-
ard present at investigatory interviews that might lead to discipline.
A contract clause waiving this entitlement rebuts the presump-
tion.136 So viewed, the case fits neatly into a Coasean analysis. The
Coase Theorem predicts that the Weingarten holding does not affect
whether unionized workers will have the right to a shop steward at
investigatory interviews. If the union values this right more than the
company values the freedom to conduct interviews without the stew-
ard, the contract will acquiesce (explicitly or through silence) with
the Weingarten rule. IfJustice Powell's result had obtained a major-
ity, the contract would contain an express clause around that
holding. 13 7
This Coasean prediction is subject to the same criticisms dis-
cussed in the Milwaukee I & II context. First, if transaction costs
exceed the gains from trade, the Weingarten decision may affect
whether workers have the right to a shop steward. Again, though,
labor negotiations probably have lower transaction costs than do
many other negotiations. Labor negotiations lack the free-rider and
holdout problems prevalent in multiple party negotiations. Further,
because the parties are also bargaining over other issues, the margi-
nal costs of negotiating the Weingarten right are likely to be small.
132 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973).
133 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
134 420 U.S. at 260.
135 Id. at 273-75 (Powell, J., dissenting).
136 Justice Powell noted that the majority in Weingarten did not indicate whether the
union could waive its initial Weingarten right. Id. at 275 n.8. After initial hesitation, the
Board has now held that a union may waive an employee's right to be represented at an
interview the employee reasonably believes might result in discipline. Compare Pruden-
tial Ins. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1591, 1592 (1980), enforcement denied, 661 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.
1981) with Prudential Ins. Co., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1073 (1985).
137 The Coasean analysis applies analogously when the company values the right
more highly than the union does. In that situation, the contract would waive the Wein-
garten right. If Justice Powell's position were the rule, the parties would not write
around the rule. For ease of exposition, I assume throughout that the union values the
Weingarten right more highly than the company values a reverse-Weingarten right.
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Finally, the either/or nature of the right means that transaction
costs will not prevent an efficient trade unless they exceed the differ-
ence in the parties' valuations of the right.
Second, the strategic bargaining problems-bluffs and lies-
match those in Milwaukee I & H, and labor law's duty to bargain in
good faith mitigates them in similar ways. Again, as in Milwaukee I &
11, the either/or choice limits the inefficiencies from lying. The
union may have strategic reasons to understate its valuation of the
Weingarten right. But as long as the union signals that it values the
right more highly than the company does, this undervaluation will
not cause the union to waive the Weingarten right. Finally, unlike
Milwaukee I & 11's high-stakes stay/go clause, the parties are less
likely to risk a major strike or loss of good will over a relatively mi-
nor issue such as Weingarten.
Third, the argument that wealth effects invalidate the Coase
Theorem has less force in the Weingarten situation. The right to
transfer work may be so important that the wealth effects of Milwau-
kee I or II change bargaining outcomes. Certainly the threat of
transfer distresses unions in many industries. In situations with less
dramatic wealth effects, the invariance thesis is more likely to hold.
For example, the Weingarten right to a union steward at disciplinary
interviews, although important, is probably not so significant that
union members would value the right differently if Justice Powell's
dissent were the rule.
Finally, Weingarten involves relatively minor imperfect informa-
tion problems. Unlike in Milwaukee I & II, where the union had diffi-
culty evaluating the likelihood that the company would move, in the
Weingarten situation the union can more easily evaluate the right to
have a steward present at disciplinary interviews. The union can
base such a valuation on its first-hand knowledge of the frequency
and results of disciplinary interviews. Conversely, the one-shot na-
ture of a work transfer exacerbates the difficulty of valuing the Mil-
waukee I or II right. If the Coasean analysis has validity in difficult
cases like Milwaukee I and II, it is a fortiori of considerable utility in
simpler cases like Weingarten.
In sum, the Coase Theorem can be applied with some confi-
dence to Weingarten. The Supreme Court decision should not affect
whether unionized workers have the right to a union representative
at investigatory interviews. Rather, that right depends on whether
the company or the union values it more highly. Because the Wein-
garten rule cannot affect efficiency, justifications for it based on in-
dustrial peace are misplaced.
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V
PROPER ARGUMENTS IN THESE CASES
Despite these criticisms of the Coase Theorem as applied to
collective bargaining, this article's central argument remains viable.
In cases like Milwaukee I and II, or Weingarten, the power of the law to
affect collective bargaining contracts is constricted by the parties'
ability to bargain around Board rules. Therefore, decision makers
should not justify their result by citing national policy arguments
such as industrial peace. Instead, arguments justifying the distribu-
tional consequences of the decision are appropriate. As discussed
earlier, legal rules in this area have short-run and perhaps long-run
distributional consequences.
One legitimate argument would emphasize equalizing the bar-
gaining strength of labor and management. This goal, like the
broad goal of industrial peace, is articulated in section 1 of the
NLRA. 138 Because this goal specifically requires that decision mak-
ers openly favor the weaker party, traditionally unions, 3 9 I distin-
guish it from a "national policy" like industrial peace.
The Supreme Court explicitly relied on the goal of equal bar-
gaining strength in Weingarten.140 The Court held that an employer
violates the NLRA by denying an employee's request for a union
representative at an investigatory interview that might result in dis-
cipline. Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan reasoned that re-
quiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview
"perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate, and
bars recourse to the safeguards the Act provided 'to redress the per-
ceived imbalance of economic power between labor and manage-
ment.' "141 Because this section 1 goal is not neutral, the Court
often downplays it.142 Nevertheless, in the class of cases at issue
138 "[R]estoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees" is
an express goal of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
139 Congress wrote the "equality" goal in neutral terms, calling on the Board to
"restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employer and employees." Id. Con-
ceivably, the Board could explicitly favor management under this goal. In reality, how-
ever, employees are consistently recognized as the weaker party, and the Board
following this goal will systematically favor employees.
140 460 U.S. at 262; see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 835 (1984)
(relying on "a congressional intent to create an equality in bargaining power between
the employee and the employer throughout the entire process of labor organizing, col-
lective bargaining, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements").
141 420 U.S. at 262 (quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316
(1965)).
142 Indeed, the Supreme Court has often emphasized that the Board should not reg-
ulate economic weapons under the guise of promoting bargaining equality. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960) ("Our labor policy...
does [not] contain a charter for the National Labor Relations Board to act at large in
equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer and union."); NLRB v.
1987] 283
284 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:245
here,143 a distributional rationale such as promoting equality is the
only appropriate justification for the Board to give.
Decisions under the Act also have recognized a distributional
goal that systematically favors management. The protection of
"management rights" is never explicitly stated in the Act, but is uni-
versally acknowledged by the Board and courts.' 44 Justice Powell,
dissenting in Weingarten, relied on this management rights rationale.
He emphasized that "[t]he power to discipline or discharge employ-
ees has been recognized uniformly as one of the elemental preroga-
tives of management." 145 Unless limited by statute or the collective
bargaining agreement, argued Justice Powell, employers can dis-
charge employees at will and use any process they choose in decid-
ing whether to fire an employee. Under Coasean analysis, "inherent
management rights" is a relevant rationale for setting initial pre-
sumptions. The rationale is not based on a societal efficiency goal
over which the law has no power, and thus offers a justification that
honestly recognizes the consequences of the decision.
Justice Powell also used the industrial peace goal to defend his
position.146 Because the union can waive its Weingarten right in ne-
gotiating the contract, the industrial peace argument is improper.
All Weingarten establishes is the initial positions from which the par-
ties are free to bargain: the Coase Theorem predicts that the
Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965) ("We begin with the proposition that the Act does not
constitute the Board as an 'arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in
seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands.'" (quoting Insurance Agents, 361
U.S. at 497)); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 310 (1965) ("[T]he Act's
provisions are not indefinitely elastic, content-free forms to be shaped in whatever man-
ner the Board might think best conforms to the proper balance of bargaining power.");
see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
144 For example, the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S.
333, 345 (1938), thought that the management "right to protect and continue his busi-
ness" during a strike, never explicitly mentioned in the Act, obviously allowed an em-
ployer to hire permanent replacements for the strikers. The Court has also recognized
by implication the "employer's right to control the use of his property" in holding that
the employer could bar nonemployee union organizers from its property. NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 110 (1956) (citing LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253,
1260-61 (1944)). See generally J. PHELPS, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION
PROCESS (1956); G. TORRENCE, MANAGEMENT'S RIGHT TO MANAGE (rev. ed. 1968).
145 420 U.S. at 273 (Powell, J., dissenting).
146 "The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with ac-
credited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial
peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the
Act in itself does not attempt to compel." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). The National Labor Relations Act
only creates the structure for the parties' exercise of their respective eco-
nomic strengths; it leaves definition of the precise contours of the em-
ployment relationship to the collective-bargaining process.
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Supreme Court decision will not affect whether employees may have
a union representative present at an investigatory interview. Only
if the union values this right more than the company values the
right to interview without a union representative will the contract
give employees this right. Thus, the Supreme Court decision does
not affect industrial peace either by allowing the parties to bargain
freely (because Weingarten allows parties to negotiate over this mat-
ter) or by granting employees the right to a union representative at
the interview (because Weingarten does not affect whether the con-
tract will give employees this right).
Returning to the Milwaukee I and 11 decisions, this analysis re-
quires that the Board use distributional rationales in deciding
whether to presume a stay or go clause. Thus, the following deci-
sions would be honest ones:
Chairman Van de Water (Milwaukee I): We are asked today to
set an initial presumption in interpreting a collective bargaining
agreement: Does the agreement allow the company to move dur-
ing the contract term? We realize that the agreement contains no
clause directly on point. Now we could dredge up boilerplate
about industrial peace and vigorous commerce being furthered by
our reading into the contract a no relocation clause. But our indi-
vidual decision cannot affect industrial peace or vigorous com-
merce, because the parties can reverse our decision by writing an
express clause into the contract. Our decision can only force one
side to make concessions to get its preferred clause into the con-
tract. Section 1 of the NLRA directs the Board to alleviate the
"inequality of bargaining power between labor and manage-
ment." In a work-transfer situation, labor is weak and vulnerable.
Therefore, we hold that every contract has an implied no reloca-
tion clause unless the contract expressly indicates otherwise.
Chairman Dotson (Milwaukee 11): We are asked today to set
an initial presumption in interpreting a collective bargaining
agreement: Does the agreement allow the company to move dur-
ing the contract term? We realize that the agreement contains no
clause directly on point. Now we could dredge up boilerplate
about industrial peace and vigorous commerce being furthered by
our reading into the contract a relocation clause. But our individ-
ual decision cannot affect industrial peace or vigorous commerce,
because the parties can reverse our decision by writing an express
clause into the contract. Our decision can only force one side to
make concessions to get its preferred clause into the contract.
The decision to transfer work is a traditional management prerog-
ative. We should interpret all collective bargaining contracts as
maintaining traditional management prerogatives unless specifi-
cally waived. Therefore, we hold that every contract has an im-
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plied right-to-go clause unless the contract expressly indicates
otherwise.
VI
CODA: NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COASE THEOREM
If the costless Coase Theorem applies to cases such as Milwau-
kee I and II and Weingarten, the Board cannot affect the efficiency of
collective bargaining agreements. This article suggests that the
Coasean prediction does apply to these cases, despite several criti-
cisms and qualifications. Thus, because the Board has no influence
over efficiency, it should concern itself exclusively with distribution
arguments. If transaction costs, strategic bargaining, or some other
impediment prevents labor negotiators from reaching efficient bar-
gains, however, the Board rule may very well affect efficiency. The
question then becomes what relevance does the preceding analysis
have for the Board and courts?
Some scholars have extrapolated from the Coase Theorem a
normative policy prescription to promote efficiency. 147 For exam-
ple, Judge Posner has suggested that when market failure prevents
parties from reaching efficient bargains, the proper role of law is to
"mimic the market."' 48 Under a mimic-the-market approach the
Board should construe ambiguous or silent contracts as containing
the most typical clause. In this way, the Board minimizes the costs
to parties of contracting around a Board decision. To continue the
Milwaukee I and 11 example, suppose transaction costs prevent the
parties from bargaining to the efficient outcome, and the Board
desires to mimic the market. Then, the Board should determine
whether costless bargaining would have resulted in a stay or go
clause and award the entitlement accordingly.
One way the Board can decide which party values the entitle-
ment most highly (and thus would have obtained the entitlement in
a costless market) is to look at actual contracts.' 49 The Board in
147 The shift from a positive description of the effect of rules to a normative pre-
scription for what rules should be is an important one. Until this coda, this article has
analyzed the Coasean positive description that a Board rule will not affect the efficiency
of contracts. If transaction costs are significant, parties cannot write around an ineffi-
cient Board rule and the positive description fails. The normative analysis argues that,
in this case, the Board should promote efficiency by mimicking the market.
148 E.g., Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CH. L. REV. 800 (1983); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979).
149 Richard Epstein argues that when dealing with a gap in contract language the
best rule of construction is that which "reflects the dominant practice in a given class of
cases." Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REv. 947, 951 (1984).
Seeing the prevalence of employment-at-will contracts, Epstein uses this rule of con-
struction to argue that courts should not abandon the employment-at-will doctrine be-
286 [Vol. 72:245
COASE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Milwaukee H1 did note the frequency of work-preservation clauses in
collective bargaining agreements. The Board argued from this that
it should not imply a work-preservation clause in every contract. 150
Statistics cited by the Board in Milwaukee 11 suggest that somewhat
less than one-third of collective bargaining agreements have clauses
limiting management's right to transfer work.' 5 1 The more perti-
nent statistic is the percentage of contracts that contain work-pres-
ervation clauses where work preservation is truly at issue.152 When
this exceeds fifty percent, the normative mimic-the-market rule sug-
gests that the Milwaukee I rule is the appropriate presumption.
The mimic-the-market justification has some support in labor
law.'15 Both the mimic-the-market theory and labor law seek to pro-
mote efficiency. In a world of costly transactions, efficiency is pro-
moted by awarding an entitlement to the party who values it most
highly and would have obtained it but for the transaction costs. But
efficiency is hardly the only legitimate justification for decisions in a
non-Coasean world. Distributional goals, also articulated in the Act,
are equally legitimate. If transaction costs are substantial in labor
bargaining so that legal entitlements affect efficiency, both efficiency
and fairness are relevant justifications for Board rules.
cause doing so would force the majority of firms and workers to contract out of the
decision.
150 Milwaukee II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 609. The Supreme Court has also looked to the
common practice in collective bargaining to determine whether an issue should be a
mandatory subject of bargaining. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666, 684 (1981) (fact that contracts rarely give union right to participate in decisions
altering scope of enterprise weighs against mandatory bargaining); Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211-12 & 212 n.7 (1964) (widespread use of
clauses providing some limitation on subcontracting used as indication that subject
should be mandatory).
151 Milwaukee II, 268 N.L.R.B. at 603 (quoting Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
561, 570 (1966) (citing M. CHANDLER, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND UNION INTERESTS 217
(1964))).
152 The difficulty of determining the "true" behavior of the parties illustrates a diffi-
culty in implementing the mimic-the-market norm.
153 This is not the place to assess fully the merits of mimic-the-market as an appro-
priate goal in labor law. Several symposia have been devoted to the general question of
the ethics of pursuing efficiency. See Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 485 (1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 811 (1980);
see also ETHICS, EcONOMICS, AND THE LAw, 24 NoMos (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1982); Change in the Common Law: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 189
(1980); The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983).
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